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Abstract
During the week of August 6, 2007, a number of quantitative long/short equity hedge funds
experienced unprecedented losses. It has been hypothesized that a coordinated deleveraging
of similarly constructed portfolios caused this temporary dislocation in the market. Using
the simulated returns of long/short equity portfolios based on five specific valuation factors,
we find evidence that the unwinding of these portfolios began in July 2007 and continued
until the end of 2007. Using transactions data, we find that the simulated returns of a simple
marketmaking strategy were significantly negative during the week of August 6, 2007, but
positive before and after, suggesting that the Quant Meltdown of August 2007 was the
combined effects of portfolio deleveraging throughout July and the first week of August, and
a temporary withdrawal of marketmaking risk capital starting August 8th. Our simulations
point to two unwinds—a mini-unwind on August 1st starting at 10:45am and ending at
11:30am, and a more sustained unwind starting at the open on August 6th and ending at
1:00pm—that began with stocks in the financial sector and long Book-to-Market and short
Earnings Momentum. These conjectures have significant implications for the systemic risks
posed by the hedge-fund industry.
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1 Introduction and Summary
During the first half of 2007, events in the U.S. sub-prime mortgage markets affected many
parts of the financial industry, setting the stage for more turmoil in the fixed-income and
credit world. Apart from stocks in the financial sector, equity markets were largely unaffected
by these troubles. With the benefit of hindsight, however, signs of macro stress and shifting
expectations of future economic conditions were apparent in equity prices during this period.
In July 2007, the performance of certain well-known equity-valuation factors such as Fama
and French’s Small-Minus-Big (SMB) market-cap and High-Minus-Low (HML) Book-to-
Market factors began a downward trend, and while this fact is unremarkable in and of itself,
the events that transpired during the second week of August 2007 have made it much more
meaningful.
Starting on Monday, August 6th and continuing through Thursday, August 9th, some of
the most successful equity hedge funds in the history of the industry reported record losses.1
But what made these losses even more extraordinary was the fact that they seemed to be
concentrated among quantitatively managed equity market-neutral or “statistical arbitrage”
hedge funds, giving rise to the monikers “Quant Meltdown” and “Quant Quake” of 2007.
In Khandani and Lo (2007), we analyzed the Quant Meltdown of 2007 by simulating
the returns of a specific equity market-neutral strategy—the contrarian trading strategy of
Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990)—and proposed the “Unwind Hypothesis” to
explain the empirical facts (see also Goldman Sachs Asset Management, 2007, and Rothman
2007a–c). This hypothesis suggests that the initial losses during the second week of August
2007 were due to the forced liquidation of one or more large equity market-neutral portfolios,
primarily to raise cash or reduce leverage, and the subsequent price impact of this massive
1For example, the Wall Street Journal reported on August 10, 2007 that “After the close of trading,
Renaissance Technologies Corp., a hedge-fund company with one of the best records in recent years, told
investors that a key fund has lost 8.7% so far in August and is down 7.4% in 2007. Another big fund company,
Highbridge Capital Management, told investors its Highbridge Statistical Opportunities Fund was down 18%
as of the 8th of the month, and was down 16% for the year. The $1.8 billion publicly traded Highbridge
Statistical Market Neutral Fund was down 5.2% for the month as of Wednesday... Tykhe Capital, LLC—a
New York-based quantitative, or computer-driven, hedge-fund firm that manages about $1.8 billion—has
suffered losses of about 20% in its largest hedge fund so far this month...” (see Zuckerman, Hagerty, and
Gauthier-Villars, 2007), and on August 14, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Goldman Sachs Global
Equity Opportunities Fund “...lost more than 30% of its value last week...” (Sender, Kelly, and Zuckerman,
2007).
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and sudden unwinding caused other similarly constructed portfolios to experience losses.
These losses, in turn, caused other funds to deleverage their portfolios, yielding additional
price impact that led to further losses, more deleveraging, and so on. As with Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) and other fixed-income arbitrage funds in August 1998, the
deadly feedback loop of coordinated forced liquidations leading to deterioration of collateral
value took hold during the second week of August 2007, ultimately resulting in the collapse of
a number of quantitative equity market-neutral managers, and double-digit losses for many
others.
This Unwind Hypothesis underscores the apparent commonality among quantitative eq-
uity market-neutral hedge funds and the importance of liquidity in determining market
dynamics. We focus on these twin issues in this paper by simulating the performance of
typical mean-reversion and valuation-factor-based long/short equity portfolios, and by using
transactions data during the months surrounding August 2007 to measure market liquidity
and price impact before, during, and after the Quant Meltdown. With respect to the former
simulations, we find that during the month of July 2007, long-short portfolios constructed
based on traditional equity characteristics (such as Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price and
Cashflow-to-Market) steadily declined, while portfolios constructed based on “momentum”
metrics (Price Momentum and Earnings Momentum) increased. With respect to the latter
simulations, we find that intra-daily liquidity in U.S. equity markets declined significantly
during the second week of August, and that the expected return of a simple mean-reversion
strategy increased monotonically with the holding period during this time, i.e., those mar-
ketmakers that were able to hold their positions longer received higher premiums. The
shorter-term losses also imply that marketmakers reduced their risk capital during this pe-
riod. Together, these results suggest that the Quant Meltdown of August 2007 began in
July with the steady unwinding of one or more factor-driven portfolios, and this unwind-
ing caused significant dislocation in August because the pace of liquidation increased and
because liquidity providers decreased their risk capital during the second week of August.
If correct, these conjectures highlight additional risks faced by investors in long/short
equity funds, namely “tail risk” due to occasional liquidations and deleveraging that may
be motivated by events completely unrelated to equity markets. Such risks also imply that
long/short equity strategies may contribute to systemic risk because of their ubiquity, their
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importance to market liquidity and price continuity, and their impact on market dynamics
when capital is suddenly withdrawn.
As in Khandani and Lo (2007), we wish to acknowledge at the outset that the hypothe-
ses advanced in this paper are speculative, tentative, and based solely on indirect evidence.
Because the events surrounding the Quant Meltdown involve hedge funds, proprietary trad-
ing desks, and their prime brokers and credit counterparties, primary sources are virtually
impossible to access. Such sources are not at liberty to disclose any information about their
positions, strategies, or risk exposures, hence the only means for obtaining insight into these
events are indirect. However, in contrast to our earlier claim in Khandani and Lo (2007)
that “...the answer to the question of what happened to the quants in August 2007 is indeed
known, at least to a number of industry professionals who were directly involved...”, we now
believe that industry participants directly involved in the Quant Meltdown may not have
been fully aware of the broader milieu in which they were operating. Accordingly, there is
indeed a role for academic studies that attempt to piece together the various components of
the market dislocation of August 2007 by analyzing the simulated performance of specific
investment strategies like the strategies considered in this paper and in Khandani and Lo
(2007).
Nevertheless, we recognize the challenges that outsiders face in attempting to understand
such complex issues without the benefit of hard data, and emphasize that our educated
guesses may be off the mark given the limited data we have to work with. We caution
readers to be appropriately skeptical of our hypotheses, as are we.
We begin in Section 2 with a brief review of the literature. The data we use to construct
our “quant” factors and perform our strategy simulations are described in Section 3. The
factor definitions and the results of the factor-based simulations are contained in Section 4.
In Section 5, we use two alternate measures of market liquidity to assess the evolution of
liquidity in the equity markets since 1995, and how it changed during the Quant Meltdown
of 2007. Using these tools, we are able to pinpoint the origins of the Meltdown to a specific
date and time, and even to particular groups of stocks. We conclude in Section 6.
3
2 Literature Review
Although the focus of our study is the Quant Meltdown of August 2007, several recent
papers have considered the causes and inner workings of the broader liquidity and credit
crunch of 2007–2008. For example, Gorton (2008) discusses the detail of security design and
securitization of sub-prime mortgages and argues that lack of transparency arising from the
interconnected link of securitization is at the heart of the problem. Brunnermeier (2008)
argues that the mortgage-related losses are relatively small. For example, he indicates that
the total expected losses are about the same amount of wealth lost in a non-so-uncommon
2% to 3% drop in the U.S. stock market. Starting from this observation, he emphasizes the
importance of the amplification mechanism at play, and argues that borrowers’ deteriorating
balance sheets generate liquidity spirals from relatively small shocks. Once started, these
spirals continue as lower asset prices and higher volatility raise margin levels and lower
available leverage. Adrian and Shin (2008) document a pro-cyclical relationship between
the leverage of U.S. investment banks and the sizes of their balance sheets and explore
the aggregate effects that such a relationship can have on asset prices and the volatility
risk premium. This empirical observation increases the likelihood of Brunnermeier’s (2008)
margin and deleveraging spiral. Allen and Carletti (2008) provide a more detailed analysis of
the role of liquidity in the financial crisis and consider the source of the current “cash-in-the-
market” pricing, i.e. market prices that are significantly below what plausible fundamentals
would suggest.
Following the onset of the credit crunch in July 2007, beginning on August 6th, many
equity hedge funds reported significant losses and much of the blame was placed on quanti-
tative factors, or the “Quants”, as the most severe losses appear to have been concentrated
among quantitative hedge funds. The research departments of the major investment banks
were quick to produce analyses, e.g., Goldman Sachs Asset Management (2007) and Roth-
man (2007a,b,c), citing coordinated losses among portfolios constructed according to several
well-known quant factors, and arguing that simultaneous deleveraging and a lack of liquidity
were responsible for these losses. For example, the study by Rothman (2007a)—which was
first released on August 9, 2007—reports the performance of a number of quant factors and
attributes the simultaneous bad performance to “a liquidity based deleveraging phenomena”.
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Goldman Sachs Asset Management (2007) provide additional evidence from foreign equity
markets (Japan, U.K., and Europe-ex-U.K.), indicating that the unwinds involved more than
just U.S. securities. In a follow-up study, Rothman (2007b) called attention to the perils
of endogenous risk; in referring to the breakdown of the risk models during that period, he
concluded that: “By and large, they understated the risks as they were not calibrated for
quant managers/models becoming our own asset class, creating our own contagion”.2 Using
TASS hedge-fund data and simulations of a specific long/short equity strategy, Khandani
and Lo (2007) hypothesized that the losses were initiated by the rapid “unwind” of one or
more sizable quantitative equity market-neutral portfolios. Given the speed and price impact
with which this occurred, we argued that it was likely the result of a forced liquidation by
a multi-strategy fund or proprietary-trading desk, possibly due to a margin call or a risk
reduction. These initial losses then put pressure on a broader set of long/short and long-only
equity portfolios, causing further losses by triggering stop/loss and deleveraging policies. A
significant rebound of these strategies occurred on August 10th, which is also consistent with
the unwind hypothesis (see, also, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, 2007, and Rothman,
2007c).
In its conclusion, the Goldman Sachs Asset Management (2007) study suggests that
“. . .it is not clear that there were any obvious early warning signs. . . No one, however, could
possibly have forecasted the extent of deleveraging or the magnitude of last weeks factor
returns”. Our analysis suggests that the dislocation was exacerbated by the withdrawal of
marketmaking risk capital—possibly by high-frequency hedge funds—starting on August 8th.
This highlights the endogenous nature of liquidity risk and the degree of interdependence
among market participants, or “species” in the terminology of Farmer and Lo (1999). The
fact that the ultimate origins of this dislocation were apparently outside the long/short equity
sector—most likely in a completely unrelated set of markets and instruments—suggests that
systemic risk in the hedge-fund industry has increased significantly in recent years.
In this paper, we turn our attention to the impact of quant factors before, during, and
after the Quant Meltdown, using a set of the most well-known factors from the academic
“anomalies” literature such as Banz (1981), Basu (1983), Bahandari (1988), and Jegadeesh
2See also Montier (2007).
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and Titman (1993). Although the evidence for some of these anomalies is subject to debate,3
nevertheless they have resulted in various multi-factor pricing models such as the widely cited
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. We limit our attention to five factors: three
value-factors similar to those in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), and two momentum
factors as in Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), and describe their construction in
Sections 3 and 4.
3 The Data
We use three sources of data for our analysis. All of our analysis focuses on the members of
S&P Composite 1500, which includes all stocks in the S&P 500 (large-cap), S&P 400 (mid-
cap), and S&P 600 (small-cap) indexes. Annual and quarterly balance-sheet information
from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database is used to calculate the relevant characteristics
for the members of the S&P 1500 index in 2007. To study market microstructure effects,
we use the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) dataset from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
In addition, we use daily stock returns and volume from the University of Chicago’s Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to calculate the daily returns of various long/short
portfolios and their trading volumes. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 contain brief overviews of the
Compustat and TAQ datasets, respectively, and we provide details for the CRSP dataset
throughout the paper as needed.
3.1 Compustat Data
Balance-sheet information is obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database via
the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) platform. We use the “CRSP/Compustat
Merged Database” to map the balance-sheet information to CRSP historical stock returns
data. From the annual Compustat database, we use:
• Book Value Per Share (item code BKVLPS)
• Basic Earnings Per Share Excluding Extraordinary Items (item code EPSPX)
• Net Cashflow of Operating Activities (item code OANCF)
• Fiscal Cumulative Adjustment Factor (item code ADJEX F)
3See, for example, Fama and French (2006), Lewellen and Nagel (2006), and Ang and Chen (2007).
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We also use the following variables from the quarterly Compustat database:
• Quarterly Basic Earnings Per Share Excluding Extraordinary Items (item
code EPSPXQ)
• Cumulative Adjustment Factor by Ex-Date (item code ADJEX)
• Report Date of Quarterly Earnings (item code RDQ)
There is usually a gap between the end of the fiscal year or quarter and the date that the
information is available to the public. We implement the following rules to make sure any
information used in creating the factors is, in fact, available on the date that the factor is
calculated. For the annual data, a gap of at least 4 months is enforced (for example, an
entry with date of December 2005 is first used starting in April 2006) and to avoid using old
data, we exclude data that are more than 1 year and 4 months old, i.e., if a security does
not have another annual data point after December 2005, that security is dropped from the
sample in April 2007). For the quarterly data, we rely on the date given in Compustat for
the actual reporting date (item code RDQ, Report Date of Quarterly Earnings) to ensure
that the data is available on the portfolio construction date. For the handful of cases that
RDQ is not available, we employ an approach similar to that taken for the annual data. In
those cases, to ensure that the quarterly data is available on the construction date and not
stale, the quarterly data is used with a 45-day gap and any data older than 135 days is not
used (for example, to construct the portfolio in April 2007, we use data from December 2006,
and January or February 2007, and do not use data from April or March 2007).
3.2 TAQ Transactions Data
The NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database contains intra-day transactions and quotes data
for all securities listed on the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange, the Nasdaq National
Market System, and SmallCap issues. The dataset consists of the Daily National Best Bids
and Offers (NBBO) File, the Daily Quotes File, the Daily TAQ Master File, and the Daily
Trades File. For the purposes of this study, we only use actual trades as reported in the
Daily Trades File. This file includes information such as the security symbol, trade time,
size, exchange on which the trade took place, as well as a few condition and correction flags.
We only use trades that occur during normal trading hours (9:30am to 4:00pm). We also
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discarded all records that have a Trade Correction Indicator field entries other than “00”4
and removed all trades that were reported late or reported out of sequence, according to the
Sale Condition field.5 During the 63 trading days of our sample of TAQ data from July 2,
2007 to September 28, 2007, the stocks within the universe of our study—the S&P 1500—
yielded a total of approximately 805 million trades, ranging from a low of 4.9 million trades
on July 3, 2007 to a high of 23.7 million trades on August 16, 2007. The cross-sectional
variation of the number of trades was quite large; for example, there were approximately 11
million trades in Apple (AAPL) during our sample period while Lawson Products (LAWS)
was only traded 6,830 times during the same period. On average, we analyzed approximately
11.3 million trades per day to develop our liquidity measures.
Using transactions prices in the Daily Trades File, we construct 5-minute returns within
each trading day (no overnight returns are allowed) based on the most recent transactions
price within each 5-minute interval, subject to the filters described above. These returns are
the inputs to the various strategy simulations reported in Section 4 and 5. For the estimation
of price-impact coefficients in Section 5.3, transactions prices are used, again subject to the
same filters described above.
4 Factor Portfolios
To study the Quant Meltdown of August 2007, we use the returns of several long/short equity
market-neutral portfolios based on the kinds of quantitative processes and characteristic
based security rankings that might be used by quant funds. For example, it is believed that
the value premium is a proxy for a market-wide distress factor (see Fama and French, 1992).6
Fama and French (1995) note that the typical value stock has a price that has been driven
down due to financial distress. This observation suggests a direct explanation of the value
4According to the TAQ documentation, a Trade Correction Indicator value of “00” signifies a regular
trade which was not corrected, changed or canceled. This field is used to indicate trades that were later
signified as errors (code “07” or “08”), canceled records (code “10”), as well as several other possibilities.
Please see the TAQ documentation for more details.
5These filters have been used in other studies based on TAQ data; see, for example, Christie, Harris and
Schultz (1994) or Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001). See the TAQ documentation for further details.
6Kao and Shumaker (1999) document some intuitive links between macro factors and the return for value
stocks. Of course, the problem can be turned on its head and stock returns can be used to predict future
macro events, as in Liew and Vassalou (2000) and Vassalou (2003). Behavioral arguments are also used to
explain the apparent premium for the value factors (see Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994).
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premium: in the event of a credit crunch, stocks in financial distress will do poorly, and this
is precisely when investors are least willing to put money at risk.7
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Figure 1: The cumulative daily returns for the Market, Small Minus Big (SMB), High Minus
Low (HML), Momentum factors as well as the contrarian strategy of Lehmann (1990) and
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) for January 3, 2007 to December 31, 2007. Data for Market,
SMB, HML and Momentum factors were obtained from Kenneth French’s website (please
see footnote 8 for details). The contrarian strategy was implemented as in Khandani and
Lo (2007) using daily return for stocks listed in the S&P 1500 on January 3, 2007. Volume
represents the Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE listed securities obtained from the NYSE
Euronext website.
By simulating the returns of a portfolio formed to highlight such factors, we may be able
to trace out the dynamics of other portfolios with similar exposures to these factors. An
example of this approach is given in Figure 1, which contains the cumulative returns of the
Fama and French SMB and HML portfolios as well as a Price-Momentum factor portfolio
during 2007.8 Trading volume during this period also shows some unusual patterns, giving
some support to the Unwind Hypothesis mentioned above. During the week of July 23,
7One should note that the “distress” of an individual firm cannot be treated as a risk factor since such
distress is idiosyncratic and can be diversified away. Only aggregate events that a significant portion of the
population of investors care about will result in a risk premium.
8Data was obtained from the data library section of Kenneth French’s web site:
http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
Please refer to the documentation available from that site for further details.
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2007, volume began building to levels well above normal.9 The average volume during the
weeks of July 23, July 30, August 6, and August 13 reached record levels of 2.9, 3.0, 3.6, and
3.1 billion shares, respectively, before finally returning to a more normal level of 1.9 billion
shares during the week of August 20.
Figure 1 also displays the cumulative return of Lehmann’s (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay’s
(1990) short-term mean-reversion or “contrarian” strategy which was used by Khandani and
Lo (2007) to illustrate the Quant Meltdown of 2007.10 The sudden drop and recovery of
this strategy during the week of August 6th, following several weeks of lower than expected
performance, captures much of the dislocation during this period.
To develop some intuition for this dislocation, consider the underlying economic moti-
vation for the contrarian strategy. By taking long positions in stocks that have declined
and short positions in stocks that have advanced over the previous trading day, the strategy
actively provides liquidity to the marketplace.11 By implicitly making a bet on daily mean
reversion among a large universe of stocks, the strategy is exposed to any continuation or
persistence in the daily returns, i.e., price trends or momentum.12 Broad-based momentum
across a group of stocks can arise from a large-scale liquidation of a portfolio that may take
several days to complete, depending on the size of the portfolio and the urgency of the liq-
uidation. In short, the contrarian strategy under-performs when the usual mean reversion
in stock prices in replaced by a momentum, possibly due to a sizable and rapid liquidation.
We will elaborate on this theme in Section 5.1.
In Section 4.1, we describe five specific factors that we propose for capturing the events of
August 2007, and in Section 4.2 we present the simulations for these factor portfolios before,
during, and after the Quant Meltdown.
9The first day with extremely high volume is June 22, 2007, which was the re-balancing day for all Russell
indexes, and a spike in volume was expected on this day because of the amount of assets invested in funds
tracking these indexes.
10Components of the S&P 1500 as of January 3, 2007 are used. Strategy holdings are constructed and the
daily returns are calculated based on the Holding Period Return from the CRSP daily returns file. See
Khandani and Lo (2007) for further details.
11By definition, losers are stocks that have under-performed relative to some market average, implying a
supply/demand imbalance in the direction of excess supply that has caused the prices of those securities to
drop, and vice-versa for the winners. By buying losers and selling winners, the contrarians are adding to the
demand for losers and increasing the supply of winners, thereby stabilizing supply/demand imbalances.
12Note that positive profits for the contrarian strategy may arise from sources other than mean reversion.
For example, positive lead-lag relations across stocks can yield contrarian profits (see Lo and MacKinlay,
1990 for details).
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4.1 Factor Construction
We focus our analysis on five of the most studied and most highly cited quantitative equity
valuation factors: three value measures, Price Momentum, and Earnings Momentum. The
three value measures, Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, and Cashflow-to-Market, are sim-
ilar to the factors discussed in Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994). These factors are
based on the most recent annual balance-sheet data from Compustat and constructed ac-
cording to the procedure described below. The two remaining factors—Price Momentum and
Earnings Momentum—have been studied extensively in connection with momentum strate-
gies (see for example Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). The Earnings Momentum
factor is based on quarterly earnings from Compustat, while the Price Momentum factor
is based on the reported monthly returns from the CRSP database. At the end of each
month, each of these five factors is computed for each stock in the S&P 1500 index using
the following procedure:
1. The Book-to-Market factor is calculated as the ratio of the Book Value Per Share
(item code BKVLPS in Compustat) reported in the most recent annual report (subject
to the availability rules outlined in Section 3.1) divided by the closing price on the last
day of the month. Share adjustment factor from CRSP and Compustat are used to
correctly reflect changes in the number of outstanding common shares.
2. The Earnings-to-Price factor is calculate based on the Basic Earnings Per Share
Excluding Extraordinary Items (item code EPSPX in Compustat) reported in the
most recent annual report (subject to the availability rules outlined in Section 3.1)
divided by the closing price on the last day of the month. Share adjustment factor
available in CRSP and Compustat are used to correctly reflect stock splits and other
changes in the number of outstanding common shares.
3. The Cashflow-to-Market factor is calculated based on the Net Cashflow of Operat-
ing Activities (item code OANCF in Compustat) reported in the most recent annual
data (subject to the availability rules outlined in Section 3.1) divided by the total mar-
ket cap of common equity on the last day of the month. Number of shares outstanding
and the closing price reported in CRSP files are used to calculate the total market
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value of common equity.
4. The Price Momentum factor is the stock’s cumulative total return (calculated using
holding period return from CRSP files which includes dividends) over the period span-
ning the previous 2 to 12 months.13
5. The Earnings-Momentum factor is constructed basedQuarterly Basic Earnings Per
Share Excluding Extraordinary Item (item code EPSPXQ in Compustat) using
the standardized unexpected earnings, SUE. The SUE factor is calculated as the ratio
of the earnings growth in the most recent quarter (subject the availability rules outlined
in Section 3.1) relative to the year earlier divided by the standard deviation of the same
factor calculated over the prior 8 quarters (see Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996,
for a more detailed discussion of this factor).
At the end of each month during our sample period, we divide the S&P 1500 universe into
10 deciles according to each factor. Decile 1 will contain the group of companies with the
lowest value of the factor; for example, companies whose stocks have performed poorly in
the last 2 to 12 month will be in the first decile of the Price Momentum factor. Deciles 1
through 9 will have the same number of stocks and decile 10 may have a few more if the
original number of stocks was not divisible by 10. We do not require a company to have
data for all five factors or to be a U.S. common stock to be used in each ranking. However,
we use only those stocks that are listed as U.S. common shares (CRSP Share Code “10”
or “11”) to construct portfolios and analyze returns.14 For example, if a company does not
have 8 quarters of earnings data, it cannot be ranked according to the Earnings Momentum
factor, but it will still be ranked according to other measures if the information required for
calculating those measures is available.
This process yields decile rankings for each of these factors for each month of our sample.
In most months, we have the data to construct deciles for more than 1,400 companies.
However, at the time we obtained the Compustat data for this analysis, the Compustat
13The most recent month is not included, similar to the Price-Momentum factor available on Kenneth
French’s data library (see footnote 8).
14This procedure should not impact our analysis materially as there are only 50 to 60 stocks in the
S&P indexes without these share codes, and these are typically securities with share code “12”, indicating
companies incorporated outside the U.S.
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database was still not fully populated with the 2007 quarterly data; in particular, the data
for the quarter ending September 2007 (2007Q3) was very sparse. Given the 45-day lag
we employ for quarterly data, the lack of data for 2007Q3 means that the deciles can be
formed for only about 370 companies at the end of November 2007 (the comparable count
was 1,381 in October 2007 and 1,405 at the end of September 2007). Since any analysis of
factor models for December 2007 is impacted by this issue, we will limit all our study to the
first 11 months of 2007.
Given the decile rankings of the five factors, we can simulate the returns of portfolios
based on each of these factors. In particular, for each of the five factors, at the end of each
month in our sample period, we construct a long/short portfolio by investing $1 long in the
stocks in the 10th decile and investing $1 short in the stocks in the 1st decile of that month.
Each $1 investment is distributed using equal weights among stocks in the respective decile
and each portfolio is purchased at the closing price on the last trading day of the previous
month. For the daily analysis, the cumulative return is calculated using daily returns based
on the Holding Period Return available from CRSP daily returns files. For the intra-
day return analysis, we compute the value of long/short portfolios using the most recent
transactions price in each 5-minute interval based on TAQ Daily Trades File (see Section 3.2
for details). We use the Cumulative Factor to Adjust Price (CFACPR) from the CRSP
daily files to adjust for stock splits, but do not adjust for dividend payments.15 Each portfolio
is rebalanced on the last trading day of each month, and a new portfolio is constructed. For
a few rare cases where a stock stops trading during the month, we assume that the final
value of the initial investment in that stock is kept in cash for the remainder of the month.
4.2 Market Behavior in 2007
Figure 2 contains the daily cumulative returns for each of the five factors in 2007 through
the end of November. The results are consistent with the patterns in Figure 1—the three
value factors began their downward drift at the start of July 2007, consistent with the HML
15Our intra-day returns are unaffected by dividend payments, hence our analysis of marketmaking profits
and price-impact coefficients should be largely unaffected by omitting this information. However, when we
compute cumulative returns for certain strategies that involve holding overnight positions, small approxi-
mation errors may arise from the fact that we do not take dividends into account when using transacations
data.
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factor-portfolio returns in Figure 1. On the other hand, the two momentum factors were the
two best performers over the second half of 2007, again consistent with Figure 1. Also, the
two momentum factors and the Cashflow-to-Market portfolio experienced very large drops
and subsequent reversals during the second week of August 2007.
Of course, secular declines and advances of factor portfolios need not have anything to
do with deleveraging or unwinding; they may simply reflect changing market valuations of
value stocks, or trends and reversals that arise from typical market fluctuations. To establish
a link between the movements of the five factor portfolios during July and August 2007 and
the Unwind Hypothesis, we perform two cross-sectional regressions each day from January
to November 2007 using daily stock returns and turnover as the dependent variables:
Ri,t = αt +
5∑
f=1
βf,tDi,f + ǫi,t (1a)
TOi,t = γt +
5∑
f=1
δf,t|Di,f − 5.5| + ηi,t (1b)
where Ri,t is the return for security i on day t, Di,f is the decile ranking of security i according
to factor f ,16 and TOi,t, the turnover for security i on day t, is defined as:
17
TOi,t ≡
Number of Shares Traded for Security i on Day t
Number of Share Outstanding for Security i on Day t
. (2)
If, as we hypothesize, there was a significant unwinding of factor-based portfolios in July and
August 2007, the explanatory power of these two cross-sectional regressions should spike up
during those months because of the overwhelming price-impact and concentrated volume of
the unwind. If, on the other hand, it was business as usual, then the factors should not have
any additional explanatory power during that period than any other period.
The lower part of Figure 2 displays the R2’s for the regressions (1) each day during the
16Note the decile rankings change each month, and they are time dependent, but we have suppressed the
time subscript for notational simplicity.
17Turnover is the appropriate measure for trading activity in each security because it normalizes the
number of shares traded by the number of shares outstanding (see Lo and Wang, 2000, 2006). The values of
the decile rankings are reflected around the “neutral” level for the turnover regressions because stocks that
belong to either of the extreme deciles—deciles 1 and 10—are “equally attractive” according to each of the
five factors (but in opposite directions), and should exhibit “abnormal” trading during those days on which
portfolios based on such factors were unwound.
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Figure 2: Cumulative performance of five long/short equity market-neutral portfolios con-
structed from commonly used equity-valuation factors, from January 3, 2007 to December
31, 2007. Also plotted are daily R2’s and their 5-day moving averages of the following
cross-sectional regressions of returns and turnover: Ri,t = αt +
∑
5
f=1 βf,tDi,f + ǫi,t, and
TOi,t = γt +
∑
5
f=1 δf,t|Di,f − 5.5| + ηi,t, where Ri,t is the return for security i on day t, Di,f
is the decile ranking of security i according to factor f , and TOi,t, the turnover for security
i on day t, is defined as the ratio of the number of shares traded to the shares outstanding.
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sample period. To smooth the sampling variation of these R2’s, we also display their 5-day
moving average. These plots confirms that starting in late July, the turnover regression’s R2
increased significantly, exceeding 10% in early August. Moreover, the turnover-regression
R2 continued to exceed 5% for the last three months of the our sample, a threshold that was
not passed at any point prior to July 2007.
As expected, the daily return regressions typically have lower R2’s, but at the same point
in August 2007, the explanatory power of this regression also spiked above 10%, adding
further support to the Unwind Hypothesis.
4.3 Evidence from Transactions Data
To develop a better sense of the market dynamics during August 2007, we construct the intra-
day returns of long/short market-neutral portfolios based on the factors of Section 4.1 for
the two weeks before and after August 6th. Figure 3 displays the cumulative returns of these
portfolios from 9:30am on July 23rd to 4:00pm on August 17th. These patterns suggest that
on August 2nd and 3rd, long/short portfolios based on Book-to-Market, Cashflow-to-Market,
and Earnings-to-Price were being unwound, while portfolios based on Price Momentum and
Earnings Momentum were unaffected until August 8th and 9th when they also experienced
sharp losses. But on Friday, August 10th, sharp reversals in all five strategies erased nearly
all of the losses of the previous four days, returning portfolio values back to their levels on
the morning of August 6th.
Of course, this assumes that portfolio leverage did not change during this tumultuous
week, which is an unlikely assumption given the enormous losses during the first few days.
If, for example, a portfolio manager had employed a leverage ratio of 8 : 1 for the Book-to-
Market portfolio on the morning of August 1st, he would have experienced a cumulative loss
of 24% by the close of August 7th, which is likely to have triggered a reduction in leverage
at that time if not before. With reduced leverage, the Book-to-Market portfolio would not
have been able to recoup all of its losses, despite the fact that prices did revert back to their
beginning-of-week levels by the close of August 10th.
To obtain a more precise view of the trading volume during this period, we turn to the
cross-sectional regression (1) of individual turnover data of Section 4.2 on exposures to decile
rankings of the five factors of Section 4.1. The estimated impact is measured in basis points
16
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Figure 3: Cumulative returns for long/short portfolios based on five equity-valuation factors
from 9:30am July 23, 2007 to 4:00pm August 17, 2007 computed from 5-minute returns using
TAQ transactions data. Portfolios were rebalanced at the end of July 2007 to reflect the new
factors rankings. Note that these returns are constructed under the assumption that only
Reg-T leverage is used (see Khandani and Lo, 2007, for further details).
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of turnover for a unit of difference in the decile ranking; for example, an estimated coefficient
of 25 basis points for a given factor implies that ceteris paribus, stocks in the 10th decile of
that factor had a 1% (4× 25 bps) higher turnover than stocks in the 6th decile.
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Figure 4: Estimated coefficients δˆf,t and R
2 of the cross-sectional regression of daily
individual-stock turnover on absolute excess decile rankings for five valuation factors from
July 23, 2007 to August 17, 2007: TOi,t = γˆt+
∑
5
f=1 |Di,f − 5.5|δˆf,t+ ǫˆi,t, where TOi,t is the
turnover for stock i on day t and Di,f is the decile assignment for stock i based on factor
f , where the five factors are: Book-to-Market, Cashflow-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, Price
Momentum, and Earnings Momentum.
Figure 4 displays the estimated turnover impact δˆf,t and R
2 of the daily cross-sectional
regressions, which clearly shows the change in the trading activity and R2 among stocks
with extreme exposure to these five factors. The estimated coefficients are always positive,
implying that the securities ranked as “attractive” or “unattractive” according to each of
these measures, i.e., deciles 10 and 1, respectively, tend to have a higher turnover than the
securities that are ranked “neutral” (deciles 5 or 6). These coefficients are both economically
and statistically significant. For example, the median estimated coefficient during the period
of July 23 to August 12 2007 for the constant term and the five factors was: 5.19 (constant
term), 0.29 (Book to Market), 0.93 (Cash flow to Market), 1.42 (Earning to Price), 0.40
(Earnings Momentum), and 1.73 (Price Momentum), all measured in basis points. This
implies, for example, that the securities in the 1st or the 10th decile of Price Momentum
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factor had expected turnover of 5.19+1.73×4.5 = 12.98 bps, which is 2.5 times higher than
the average turnover of 5.19 bps. The statistical significance of the estimated coefficients
is also high. The median t-stat for the estimated coefficients during the period of July 23
to August 12 2007 for these factors was: 3.77 (constant term) 1.25 (Book to Market) 3.20
(Cash flow to Market) 4.40 (Earning to Price) 1.32 (Earnings Momentum) and 6.07 (Price
Momentum).
Figure 4 shows that there was a substantial jump in the Price Momentum coefficient
on August 8th, which coincides with the start of the steep losses shown in Figure 3. The
coefficients for the other factors also exhibit increases during this period, along with the
R2’s of the cross-sectional regressions, consistent with the Unwind Hypothesis. However, the
explanatory power of these regressions and the estimated impact of the factors (other than
Price Momentum) on August 8th and 9th were not markedly different than earlier in the
same week. What changed on August 8th, 9th, and 10th that yielded the volatility spike in
Figure 2? We argue in the next section that a sudden withdrawal of liquidity may be one
explanation.
5 Measures of Market Liquidity
In Section 4, we have provided suggestive but indirect evidence supporting the Unwind
Hypothesis for factor-based portfolios during the months of July and August 2007, but this
still leaves unanswered the question of what happened during the second week of August.
To address this issue head-on, in this section we focus on changes in market liquidity during
2007, and find evidence of a sharp temporary decline in liquidity during the second week of
August 2007.
To measure equity-market liquidity, we begin in Section 5.1 by analyzing the contrarian
trading strategy of Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) from a marketmaking
perspective, i.e., the provision of immediacy. Using analytical and empirical arguments, we
conclude that marketmaking profits have declined substantially over the past decade, which
is consistent with the common wisdom that increased competition—driven by a combination
of technological and institutional innovations—has resulted in greater liquidity and a lower
premium for liquidity provision services. We confirm this conjecture in Section 5.2 by esti-
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mating the price impact of equity trades using daily returns from 1995 to 2007, which shows
a substantial increase in market depth , i.e. a reduction in the price impact of trades, in
recent years. Markets were indeed much more liquid at the beginning of 2007 compared to
just five years earlier. However, using transactions data for the months of July, August, and
September 2007, in Section 5.3 we document a sudden and significant decrease in market
liquidity in August 2007. And in Section 5.4, we use these tools to detect the exact date and
time that the Meltdown started, and even the initial groups of securities that were involved.
5.1 Marketmaking and Contrarian Profits
The motivation behind the empirical analysis of this section can be understood in the con-
text of Grossman and Miller’s (1988) model. In that framework, there are two types of
market participants—marketmakers and outside customers—and the provision of liquid-
ity and immediacy by the marketmakers to randomly arriving outside customers generates
mean-reverting prices. However, as observed by Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993),
when the price of a security changes, the change in price is partly due to new fundamental
information about the security’s value, and partly due to temporary supply/demand imbal-
ances. Although the latter yields mean-reverting prices, the former is typically modeled as a
random walk where shocks are “permanent” in terms of the impulse-response function. To
understand the role of liquidity in the Quant Meltdown of 2007, we need to separate these
components.
Because the nature of liquidity provision is inherently based on mean reversion, i.e.,
buying losers and selling winners, the the contrarian strategy of Lehmann (1990) and Lo and
MacKinlay (1990) is ideally suited for this purpose. As Khandani and Lo (2007) showed, a
contrarian trading strategy applied to daily U.S. stock returns is able to trace out the market
dislocation in August 2007, and in this section, we provide an explicit analytical explication
of their results in the context of marketmaking and liquidity provision.
The contrarian strategy consists of an equal dollar amount of long and short positions
across N stocks, where at each rebalancing interval, the long positions consist of “losers”
(past underperforming stocks, relative to some market average) and the short positions con-
sist of “winners” (past outperforming stocks, relative to the same market average). Specifi-
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cally, if ωit is the portfolio weight of security i at date t, then
ωi,t = −
1
N
(Ri,t−k −Rm,t−k) , Rm,t−k ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ri,t−k (3)
for some k > 0. Observe that the portfolio weights are the negative of the degree of out-
performance k periods ago, so each value of k yields a somewhat different strategy. As
in Khandani and Lo (2007), we set k = 1 day. By buying yesterday’s losers and selling
yesterday’s winners at each date, such a strategy actively bets on one-day mean reversion
across all N stocks, profiting from reversals that occur within the rebalancing interval. For
this reason, (3) has been called a “contrarian” trading strategy that benefits from market
overreaction, i.e., when underperformance is followed by positive returns and vice-versa for
outperformance (see Khandani and Lo, 2007 for further details). A more ubiquitous source
of profitability for this strategy is the fact that liquidity is being provided to the market-
place, and investors are implicitly paying a fee for this service, both through the bid/offer
spread and from price reversals as in the Grossman and Miller (1988) model. Historically,
designated marketmakers such as the NYSE/AMEX specialists and NASDAQ dealers have
played this role, but in recent years, hedge funds and proprietary trading desks have begun to
compete with traditional marketmakers, adding enormous amounts of liquidity to U.S. stock
markets and earning attractive returns for themselves and their investors in the process.
One additional subtlety in interpreting the profitability of the contrarian strategy (3) is
the role of the time horizon over which the strategy’s profits are defined. Because the demand
for immediacy arises at different horizons, disentangling liquidity shocks and informed trades
can be challenging. All else equal, if marketmakers reduce the amount of capital they are
willing to deploy, the price impact of a liquidity trade will be larger, and the time it takes for
prices to revert back to their fundamental levels after such a trade will increase. To capture
this phenomenon, we propose to study the expected profits of the contrarian trading strategy
for various holding periods. In particular, consider a strategy based on the portfolio weights
(3) but where the positions are held fixed for q periods. The profits for such a q-period
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contrarian strategy are given by:18
πt(q) ≡
N∑
i=1
(
ωi,t
q∑
l=1
Ri,t+l
)
. (4)
The properties of E[πt(q)] under general covariance-stationary return-generating processes
are summarized in the following proposition (see Appendix A.1 for the derivations):
Proposition 1 Consider a collection of N securities and denote by Rt the (N×1)-vector
of their period t returns, [R1,t · · ·RN,t]
′. Assume that Rt is a jointly covariance-stationary
stochastic process with expectation E[Rt] ≡ µ ≡ [µ1 · · ·µN ]
′ and autocovariance matrices
E[(Rt−l −µ)(Rt−µ)
′] ≡ Γl ≡ [γi,j(l)]. Consider a zero net-investment strategy that invests
ωi,t dollars given by (3) in security i. The expected profits over q periods, E[πt(q)], is given
by:
E[πt(q)] = M(Γ1) + · · · + M(Γq) − q σ
2(µ) (5)
where
M(A) ≡
1
N2
ι
′
Aι −
1
N
tr(A)
σ2(µ) ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
(µi − µm)
2 and µm ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
µi (6)
and ι is an (N×1)-vector of ones.
If mean reversion implies that contrarian trading strategies will be profitable, then price
momentum implies the reverse. In the presence of return persistence, i.e., positively auto-
correlated returns, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) show that the contrarian trading strategy (3)
will exhibit negative profits. As with other marketmaking strategies, the contrarian strategy
loses when prices exhibit trends, either because of private information, which the market
microstructure literature calls “adverse selection”, or a sustained liquidation in which the
marketmaker bears the losses by taking the other side and losing value as prices move in re-
18This expression is an approximation since the return of security i in period t, Ri,t, is defined to be a
simple return, and log of the sum is not equal to the sum of the logs. The approximation error is typically
small, especially for short holding periods of just a few days.
22
sponse to the liquidation. We shall argue below that this can explain the anomalous pattern
of losses during the second week of August 2007.
To develop this argument further, suppose that stock returns satisfy the following simple
linear multivariate factor model:
Ri,t = µi + βiνt + λi,t + ηi,t (7a)
λi,t = θiλi,t−1 − ǫi,t + ǫi,t−1 , θi ∈ (0, 1) (7b)
νt = ρνt−1 + ζt , ρ ∈ (−1, 1) (7c)
where ǫi,t, ζt, and ηi,t are white-noise random variables that are uncorrelated at all leads and
lags.
The impact of random idiosyncratic supply and demand shocks are represented by ǫi,t, and
λi,t is the reduced-form expression of the interaction between public orders and marketmakers
over the cumulative history of ǫi,t’s. In particular, the reduced form (7) is an ARMA(1,1)
process that exhibits negative autocorrelation to capture the mean reversion generated by
marketmaking activity (e.g., bid/ask bounce, as in Roll, 1984). To develop a better sense of
its time-series properties, we can express λi,t as the following infinite-order moving-average
process:
λi,t = −ǫi,t +
(
1− θi
θi
)
θiǫi,t−1 +
(
1− θi
θi
)
θ2i ǫi,t−2 + · · · , θi ∈ (0, 1) . (8)
Note that the coefficients in (8) sum to zero so that the impact of each ǫi,t is temporary, and
the parameter θi controls the speed of mean reversion.
Market information is represented by the common factor νt, which can capture mean
reversion, noise, or momentum as ρ is less than, equal to, or greater than zero, respectively.
The error term ηi,t represents idiosyncratic fluctuations in security i’s returns that are unre-
lated to liquidity or to common factors. The Appendix provides additional motivation and
intuition for this specification.
By varying the parameters of the return-generating process (7), we can change the rel-
ative importance of fundamental shocks and marketmaking activity in determining security
i’s returns. For example, if we assume parameters that cause νt to dominate Ri,t, this cor-
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responds to a set of market conditions where liquidity traders are of minor importance and
the common factor is the main driver of returns. If, on the other hand, the variability of νt is
small in comparison to λi,t, this corresponds to a market where liquidity traders are the main
drivers of returns. We shall see below that these two cases lead to very different patterns
for the profitability of the contrarian strategy (3), which raises the possibility of inferring
the relative importance of these two components by studying the empirical properties of
contrarian trading profits. We perform this study below.
We now consider a few special cases of (7) to build the intuition and set the stage for the
empirical analysis.
Uncorrelated Returns
Let βi ≡ 0 and λi,t ≡ 0 in (7), implying that Rt is driven only by firm-specific idiosyncratic
shocks ηi,t that are both serially and cross-sectionally uncorrelated. In this case, Γl = 0 for
all nonzero l; hence,
E[πt(q)] = − q σ
2(µ) < 0 . (9)
Returns are both serially and cross-sectionally uncorrelated, and the expected profit is neg-
ative as long as there is some cross-sectional variation in expected returns. In this special
case, the contrarian strategy involves shorting stocks with higher expected return and buying
stocks with lower expected return, which yields a negative expected return that is linear in
the holding period q and the cross-sectional variance of the individual securities’ expected
returns.
Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks
Let ρ ≡ 0 in (7) so that the common factor is serially uncorrelated. The expected q-period
profit is then given by (please see Appendix A.2 for the derivation):
E[πt(q)] =
N − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
1− θqi
2
σ2λi − qσ
2(µ) . (10)
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In this case, the strategy benefits from correctly betting on mean reversion in λi,t but again
loses a small amount due to the cross-sectional dispersion of expected returns. For a fixed
holding period q, the expected profit is an increasing function of the volatility σ2λi of the
liquidity component, and a decreasing function of the speed of mean reversion, θi, which
is consistent with our intuition for the returns to marketmaking. Moreover, as long as the
cross-sectional dispersion of expected returns, σ2(µ), is not too large, the expected profit
will be an increasing and concave function of the length of the holding period, q.
Common-Factor and Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks
Now suppose that ρ 6= 0 in (7), so that the common factor is autocorrelated. In this case,
the expected q-period profit is given by (see Appendix A.2 for the derivation):
E[πt(q)] =
N − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
1− θqi
2
σ2λi − ρ
1− ρq
1− ρ
σ2νσ
2(β) − qσ2(µ) (11)
In contrast to (10), when ρ 6= 0 the contrarian strategy can profit or lose from the common
factor (depending on the sign of ρ) if there is any cross-sectional dispersion in the common-
factor betas βi. If the common factor is negatively serially correlated, i.e., ρ < 0, then the
first two terms of (11) are unambiguously positive. In this case, mean reversion in both the
common and liquidity components both contribute positively to expected profits.
If, however, the common-factor component exhibits momentum, i.e., ρ > 0, then the
first two terms in (11) are of opposite sign. By buying losers and selling winners, the
contrarian strategy (3) profits from mean-reverting liquidity shocks λi,t but suffers losses
from momentum in the common factor. For sufficiently large ρ and large cross-sectional
variability in the βi’s, the second term of (11) can dominate the first, yielding negative
expected profits for the contrarian strategy over all holding periods q.
However, if ρ is small and positive, (11) yields an interesting relation between expected
profits and the holding period q—the contrarian strategy can exhibit negative expected
profits over short holding periods due to momentum in the common factor, and yield positive
expected profits over longer holding periods as the influence of the common factor decays
and as the liquidity term grows with q.19 To see this possibility more directly, consider the
19Of course, for (11) to be positive, the liquidity term must dominate both the common-factor term as well
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following simplifications: let θi = θ and σ
2
λi
= σ2λ for all i, σ
2(µ) ≈ 0, and assume that N
is large. Then the expected profit under (7), normalized by the variance of the liquidity
component σ2λ, reduces to:
E[πt(q)]
σ2λ
≈
1− θq
2
− ρ
1− ρq
1− ρ
σ2ν
σ2λ
σ2(β) . (12)
Figure 5 plots the normalized expected profit (12) as a function of the common factor’s
autocorrelation coefficient ρ and the holding period q, assuming the following values for the
remaining parameters:20
θ =
1
2
,
σ2ν
σ2λ
= 50 , σ2(β) =
(
1
4
)2
.
Figure 5 shows that the expected profit is always increasing and concave in the holding
period, q. While mean reversion in the common factor increases the expected profits of
the strategy, for sufficiently large momentum, i.e. positive ρ, the expected profits becomes
negative for all holding periods. The more interesting intermediate region is one in which
expected profits are negative for short holding periods, but becomes positive if positions are
held for a sufficiently long period of time. This pattern will be particularly relevant in light
of the events of August 2007, as we will see below.
Empirical Results
We now apply the contrarian strategy (3) to historical U.S. stock returns from January
3, 1995 to December 31, 2007. As in Lehmann (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and
Khandani and Lo (2007), we expect to find positive expected profits for short-term holding
periods (small values of q), and the expected profits should be increasing in q but at a
decreasing rate, given the timed decay implicit in liquidity provision and its implied mean
as the cross-sectional variability in expected returns. However, since this latter component is independent
of the parameters of the liquidity and common-factor components, our comparisons center on the first two
terms of (11).
20These calibrations are arbitrary, but the motivation for the value of σ2ν/σ
2
λ is the importance of the
common factor during the Quant Meltdown, and the motivation for the value of σ2(β) is that 95% of the
betas will fall between plus and minus 0.5 of its mean if they are normally distributed with a variance of
1/16.
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Figure 5: Plot of the normalized expected profit of the contrarian strategy, 1−θ
q
2
−
ρ1−ρ
q
1−ρ
σ2ν
σ2
λ
σ2(β), for parameter values σ
2
ν
σ2
λ
= 50, σ2(β) = 1/16, and θ = 1/2, as a function of
the serial correlation coefficient of the common factor, ρ, and the holding period q.
reversion.21 By construction, the weights for the contrarian strategy (3) sum to zero, hence
the return of the strategy is ill-defined. We follow Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and the practice
of most equity market-neutral managers in computing the return of this strategy Rp,t each
period t by dividing each period’s dollar profit or loss by the total capital It required to
generate that profit or loss, hence
Rt(q) ≡ πt(q)/It , It ≡
1
2
N∑
i=1
|ωi,t| (13)
where πt(q) is given by (4).
22
Figure 6 displays the average return of the contrarian strategy when applied to compo-
21Note that as a matter of convention, we date the multi-holding-period return Rt(q) as of the date t on
which the positions are established, not the date on which the positions are closed out and the return is
realized, which is date t+q.
22This expression for Rt(q) implicitly assumes that the portfolio satisfies Regulation-T leverage, which is $1
long and $1 short for every $1 of capital. However, most equity market-neutral managers used considerably
greater leverage just prior to August 2007, and returns should be multiplied by the appropriate leverage
factor when comparing properties of this strategy between 2007 and earlier years. See Khandani and Lo
(2007) for further discussion.
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Figure 6: Average return of the contrarian strategy when portfolios are constructed based on
1-day lagged returns and positions are held for 1 to 10 days for January 3, 1995 to December
31, 2007. A return is assigned to the year in which the position was established and averages
are then calculated for different holding periods. Components of the S&P 1500 are based on
memberships as of the last day of the previous month.
nents of S&P 1500 index between January 1995 to December 2007.23 When averaged over
the entire sample, the results confirm that the average return increases in the holding period
q and, as predicted, increases at a decreasing rate. 24 Even though the average return re-
mains generally an increasing function of the holding period, its absolute level has decreased
over time. For example, the average return for years prior to 2002 are all above the full-
sample average in Figure 6 and in the years 2002 and after, they are below the full-sample
average. This pattern is consistent with the common intuition that increased competition
and technological innovations in the equity markets have reduced the profitability of such
marketmaking activity. The decline in profitability also suggests that U.S. equity markets
may be more liquid now than a decade ago, and we will confirm this conjecture in the next
section by studying the link between trading volume and price changes.
23The S&P indexes are based on the last day of the previous month and not changed through out each
month. Plots based on strategy profits, pit(q), are qualitatively the same but the values are harder to interpret
since they are not scaled by the amount of capital used.
24Clearly the actual returns calculated here are not achievable due to market micro-structure issues such
as order book competition and non-synchronous trading. For our argument in this paper, however, we only
focus on the pattern of profitability for different holding periods.
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5.2 Market Liquidity: 1995 to 2007
Many methods have been suggested for measuring liquidity in financial markets. For exam-
ple, volume is used in Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), quoted bid-ask spreads
and depths are used in Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), and the ratio of absolute
stock returns to dollar volume is proposed by Amihud (2002).25 Because the days leading up
to August 2007 exhibited unusually high volume (see Figure 1), any volume-based measure
is not likely to capture the full extent of illiquidity during that time. Instead, we take an ap-
proach motivated by Kyle’s (1985) model in which liquidity is measured by a linear-regression
estimate of the volume required to move the price by one dollar.26 Sometimes referred to as
“Kyle’s lambda”, this measure is an inverse proxy of liquidity, with higher values of lambda
implying lower liquidity and lower market depth. From an empirical perspective, this is
a better measure of liquidity than quoted depth since it captures undisclosed liquidity not
reflected in the best available quotes, and correctly reflects lower available depth if narrower
spreads come at the expense of smaller quantities available at the best bid and offer prices.
We estimate this measure using daily returns for individual stocks each month from
January 1995 to December 2007. To be included in our sample, the stock must be in the
corresponding S&P index as of the last day of the previous month and have at least 15 days
of returns in that month. Given the sequence of daily returns, {Ri,1, Ri,2, · · · , Ri,T}, closing
prices, {pi,1, pi,2, · · · , pi,T}, and volumes, {vi,1, vi,2, · · · , vi,T} for security i during a specific
month, we estimate the following regression:
Ri,t = cˆi + λˆi · Sgn(t) log(vi,tpi,t) + ǫi,t (14)
where Sgn(t) ≡ {+1 or − 1} depending on the direction of the trade, i.e., “buy” or “sell”,
as determined according to the following rule: if Ri,t is positive we assign a +1 to that entire
day (to indicate net buying), and if Ri,t is negative we assign a −1 to the entire day (to
indicate net selling).27 Any day with zero return receives the same sign as that of the most
25See Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005) and Hasbrouck (2007) for a comprehensive discussion of
different theoretical and empirical aspects of liquidity with an overview of most relevant studies in this area.
26For examples of prior empirical work based on a similar measure, see Brennan and Subrahmanyam
(1996) and Anand and Weaver (2006), or Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) for a closely related measure.
27This approach is similar to the so-called “tick test” used in many studies of transactions data for signing
trades (see, for example, Cohen et al., 1986). We adopt this method since it can be applied easily to daily
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recent prior day with a non-zero return (using returns from the prior month, if necessary).
Because of evidence that the impact of trade size on price adjustment is concave (see, for
example, Hasbrouck, 1991, Dufour and Engle, 2000, and Bouchaud, Farmer, and Lillo, 2008),
we use the natural logarithm of trade size in our analysis.28 Days with zero volume were
dropped from the sample.29 The monthly cross-sectional average of the estimated price
impact coefficients,
∑
i λˆi/N , then yields an aggregate measure of market liquidity. This
approach is similar to the aggregate liquidity measure of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
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Figure 7: Monthly cross-sectional averages of price impact coefficients λˆi of stocks in the S&P
1500 and sub-components between January 1995 and December 2007, based on daily time-
series regressions for each stock i within each month: Ri,t = cˆi + λˆi · Sgn(t) log(vi,tpi,t) + ǫi,t
where Sgn(t) log(vi,tpi,t) is the signed volume of security i on date t and the sign is determined
by “tick test” applied to daily returns. Components of these indexes are based on the
memberships on the last day of the previous month.
Figure 7 graphs the time series of our aggregate price-impact measure, and shows that
equity markets are more liquid today than a decade ago, and have become progressively
more liquid over the past five years. The spikes in price impact correspond well with known
returns. Some studies such as Finucane (2000) suggest that this method is the most reliable method for
determining whether a trade is buyer- or seller-initiated.
28We have conducted similar analysis using square root transformation of the trade size. The results, both
for daily analysis given Figure 7 and intra-day analysis given is Figure 9, were similar so our analysis is
robust to the functional form used.
29Zero-volume days are rare in general, and extremely rare among S&P 500 stocks.
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periods of uncertainty and illiquidity: the first large spike starts in August 1998 and reaches
its highest level in October 1998 (the LTCM crisis), another spike occurs in March 2000
(the end of the Technology Bubble), a third occurs in September 2001 (the September 11th
terrorist attacks), and the most recent spike occurs in August 2007 (the Quant Meltdown).
Kyle’s (1985) framework yields a market-depth function that is decreasing in the level of
informed trading, hence it is no surprise that spikes in this measure coincide with periods of
elevated uncertainty about economic fundamentals, where trading activity is more likely to be
attributed to informed trading. However, the importance of the patterns in Figure 7 for our
purposes involves the systematic nature of liquidity. Studies such as Huberman and Halka
(2001), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000,2001)
have documented commonality in liquidity using different measures and techniques. Chordia,
Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) observe common liquidity shocks between equity and bond
markets. Perhaps motivated by some of these studies, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) propose
the sensitivity to a common liquidity factor as a risk measure in an asset-pricing framework.
But how does such commonality in liquidity arise?
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) argue that a common liquidity factor can
emerge from co-movements in optimal inventory levels of marketmakers, inventory carry-
ing costs, commonality in private information, and common investing styles shared by large
institutional investors (see also Comerton-Forde et. al., 2010). Carrying costs are considered
explicitly in Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) and are modeled by Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2008). These studies suggest that the availability of credit and low carrying
costs may have contributed to the very low price-impact levels observed between 2003 and
August 2007 (see, also, Brunnermeier 2008). Institutional changes such as decimalization
and technological advances are also likely contributors to the overall trend of increasing
liquidity over the past decade.
5.3 Market Liquidity in 2007
Having documented the historical behavior of marketmaking profits and liquidity in Sections
5.1 and 5.2, we now turn our attention to the events of August 2007 by applying similar
measures to transactions data from July to September 2007 for the stocks in the S&P 1500
universe.
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For computational simplicity, we use a simpler mean-reversion strategy than the con-
trarian strategy (3) to proxy for marketmaking profits. This high-frequency mean-reversion
strategy is based on buying losers and selling winners over laggedm-minute returns, where we
varym from 5 to 60 minutes. Specifically, each trading day is broken into non-overlappingm-
minute intervals, and during eachm-minute interval we construct a long/short dollar-neutral
portfolio that is long those stocks in the lowest return-decile over the previous m-minute
interval, and short those stocks in the highest return-decile over the previous m-minute in-
terval.30 The value of the portfolio is then calculated for the next m-minute holding period,
and this procedure is repeated for each of the non-overlapping m-minute intervals during the
day.31
Figure 8 plots the cumulative returns of this mean-reversion strategy from July 2 to
September 28, 2007 for various values of m. For m = 60 minutes, the cumulative return
is fairly flat over the three-month period, but as the horizon shortens, the slope increases,
implying increasingly larger expected returns. This reflects the fact that shorter-horizon
mean reversion strategies are closer approximations to marketmaking, with correspondingly
more consistent profits. As noted before, see footnote 24, the level of returns reported in
Figure 8 are probably not achievable. However, for our arugment in this paper, we only focus
on the pattern of profitability and losses for different holding periods and across different
time periods from July to September of 2007. As shown in Figure 8, for all values of m, we
observe the same dip in profits during the second week of August. Consider, in particular,
the case where m = 5 minutes—on August 6th, the cumulative profit levels off, and then
declines from August 7th through August 13th, after which it resumes its growth path at
nearly the same rate. This inflection period suggests that there was a substantial change in
the price dynamics and potentially in the activity of market makers starting in the second
week of August.
To obtain a more concrete measure of changes in liquidity during this period, we estimate
30Stocks are equal-weighted. In case there is a tie between returns for several securities that cross the
decile threshold, we ignore all securities with equal returns to focus on the supply-demand imbalance, and
also to enhance the reproducibility of our numerical results. No overnight positions are allowed.
31We always use the last traded price in each m-minute interval to calculate returns; hence, the first set
of prices for each day are the prices based on trades just before 9:30am plus m minutes, and the first set of
positions are established at 9:30am plus 2m minutes.
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Figure 8: Cumulative return of m-minute mean-reversion strategy applied to stocks in the
S&P 1500 universe from July 2, 2007 to September 28, 2007 for m = 5, 10, 15, 30, and 60
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m minutes each day and all positions are closed at 4:00pm. Components of the S&P 1500
are based on memberships as of the last day of the previous month.
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a price-impact model according to (14) but using transactions volume and prices.32 To focus
on the change in market liquidity during this period, in Figure 9 we display the relative
increase in our price-impact measure as compared to its value on July 2, 2007 (the first day
of our sample of transactions data). The empirical evidence suggests that relative increases
in price impact was common to all market-cap groups and not limited to the smaller stocks.
Note that the specification given in (14) uses the natural logarithm of transactions dollar
volume as a regressor, hence a relative increase of 1.5 (which first occurred on July 26, 2007)
indicates a very large increase in trading costs, implying, for example, that trading 100 shares
of a stock at price of $50/share on July 26th—a total dollar volume of $5000—would have
had the same price impact as trading approximately $353,000 of stock on July 2nd!
Although Figure 8 shows that short-term marketmaking profits did not turn negative until
the second week of August, the pattern of price impact displayed in Figure 9 documents a
substantial drop in liquidity in the days leading up to August 6, 2007. 33 Given the increased
trading activity in factor-based portfolios as documented in Figure 2, sustained pressure on
market makers’ inventory levels due to the unwinding of correlated investment portfolios
seems to be the most likely explanation for such a large increase in the price impact of
trades during this time.34 Furthermore, this measure of liquidity was at its lowest level,
i.e. price impact was at its highest level, in the week after the week of August 6. This
pattern suggests that perhaps some market markers burned by the turn of events in the
week of August 6, reduced their market making capital in the following days and in turn
caused the price impacts to substantially rise starting on August 10 and remaining high
for the following week. Although NYSE/AMEX specialists and NASDAQ dealers have an
affirmative obligation to maintain orderly markets and stand ready to deal with the public,
in recent years, a number of hedge funds and proprietary trading desks have become de facto
marketmakers by engaging in high-frequency program-trading strategies that exploit mean
32We use only those transactions that occur during normal trading hours, and discard all trades that are
reported late, out of sequence, or have a non-zero correction field (see Section 3.2 for further details).
33Our analysis also shows a sudden change in liquidity on September 18th, which was the day the U.S.
Federal Open Market Committee lowered the target for the federal funds rate by 50 bps and the CBOE
Volatility Index dropped by more than 6 point to close at about 20. Based on cumulative intra-day returns
(which we have omitted to conserve space), the market values of our factor-based portfolios dropped and
subsequently recovered over the following two days, similar to the pattern observed in Figure 3.
34See also Comerton-Forde et. al. (2010) for an anslysis of the effect of marker makers inventory on
liquidity.
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Figure 9: The relative increase in the estimated price impact λˆi based on transactions
data regression estimates for each day from July 2, 2007 to September 28, 2007. Using
all transactions data for each security on each day, the following price-impact equation is
estimated: Ri,t = cˆi+ λˆi ·Sgn(t) log(vi,tpi,t)+ǫi,t where Sgn(t) log(vi,tpi,t) is the signed volume
of trade t in security i, where sign is determined by “tick test”. The relative increase in the
average of all λˆi for each day, using July 2, 2007 (the first day of our sample) as the base,
is then calculated as a measure of the relative decrease in market depth. Components of
various S&P indexes as of the last day of the previous month are used.
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reversion in intra-daily stock prices.35 But in contrast to exchange-designated marketmakers,
such traders are under no obligation to make markets, and can cease trading without notice.
To further explore the profitability and behavior of market markers during this period,
we use lagged 5-minute returns to establish the positions of the mean-reversion strategy, and
hold those positions for m minutes where m varies from 5 to 60 minutes, after which new
positions are established based on the most recent lagged 5-minute returns. This procedure
is applied for each day and average returns are computed for each week and each holding
period, and displayed in Figure 10. With the notable exception of the week of August 6th,
the average return is generally increasing in the length of holding period, consistent with the
patterns in the daily strategy in Section 5.1 and Figure 6.
To interpret the observed patterns in Figure 10, recall that this mean-reversion strategy
provides immediacy by buying losers and selling winners every 5 minutes. As quantitative
factor portfolios were being deleveraged and unwound during the last two weeks of July 2007,
the price for immediacy presumably increased, implying higher profits for marketmaking
strategies such as ours. This is confirmed in Figure 10. However, during the week of August
6, 2007, the average return to our simplified mean-reversion strategy turned sharply negative,
with larger losses for longer holding periods that week. This pattern is consistent with the
third special case of Proposition 1 in Section 5.1—a trending common factor and mean
reversion in the idiosyncratic liquidity factor. In particular, the pattern of losses in Figure
10 supports the Unwind Hypothesis in which sustained liquidation pressure for a sufficiently
large subset of securities created enough price pressure to overcome the profitability of our
short-term mean-reversion strategy, resulting in negative returns for holding periods from 5
minutes to 60 minutes. Figure 10 also shows a higher premium for the immediacy service
provided by market makers during the two-week period after the week of August 6. This is
consistent with our conjecture that some market makers may have reduced their exposure
after observing massive unwinding pressure in the week of August 6, hence reducing the
supply of immediacy service during that period and increasing the premium for this service.
This evidence is also consistent with the pattern of price impacts shown in Figure 9.
35The advent of decimalization in 2001 was a significant factor in the growth of marketmaking strategies
by hedge funds because of the ability of such funds to “step in front of” designated marketmakers (achieve
price priority in posted bids and offers) at much lower cost after decimalization, i.e., a penny versus 12.5
cents.
36
-35
-25
-15
-5
5
15
25
35
7/
2/
07
 to
 7
/6
/0
7
7/
9/
07
 to
 7
/1
3/
07

7/
16
/0
7 
to
 7
/2
0/
07

7/
23
/0
7 
to
 7
/2
7/
07

7/
30
/0
7 
to
 8
/3
/0
7
8/
6/
07
 to
 8
/1
0/
07

8/
13
/0
7 
to
 8
/1
7/
07

8/
20
/0
7 
to
 8
/2
4/
07

8/
27
/0
7 
to
 8
/3
1/
07

9/
4/
07
 to
 9
/7
/0
7
9/
10
/0
7 
to
 9
/1
4/
07

9/
17
/0
7 
to
 9
/2
1/
07

9/
24
/0
7 
to
 9
/2
8/
07

A
ve
ra
ge
 R
et
ur
n 
(b
ps
)
5 Minutes
10 Minutes
15 Minutes
30 Minutes
60 Minutes
Figure 10: The average return for the contrarian strategy applied to 5-minute returns from
July 2, 2007 to September 28, 2007. Each day is divided into non-overlapping 5-minute
intervals, and positions are established based on lagged 5-minute returns and then held for
5, 10, 15, 30, or 60 minutes. The average return for each holding period is calculated for each
week during this sample. No overnight positions are allowed, initial positions are established
at 9:40am each day and all positions are closed at 4:00pm. Components of the S&P 1500
are based on memberships as of the last day of the previous month.
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If the losses observed in Figure 10 were indeed due to unwind pressure during the week
of August 6 and short-term demand for immediacy, these losses should revert back for those
market makers who had the ability to hold on to their position for longer periods. To test
this hypothesis, in Table 1 we compute the performance of the short-term marketmaking
strategy based on 5-minute returns for holding periods from 5 minutes to 1 hour (Panel A),
and based on daily returns for holding periods from 1 to 5 days (Panel B). Recall that this
strategy can be viewed as providing immediacy to the market at regular intervals (every
5 minutes or every day). Accordingly, the strategy will suffer losses if information flows
generate price trends over intervals that match or exceed the typical holding period of the
marketmaker.
Date  5 Minutes 10 Minutes 15 Minutes 30 Minutes 60 Minutes
8/1/2007 5.06 6.81 5.15 8.02 7.37
8/2/2007 6.74 6.97 8.47 9.48 9.02
8/3/2007 4.28 2.93 1.77 1.47 -0.62
8/6/2007 -1.30 -2.57 -3.57 -8.75 -5.30
8/7/2007 -1.12 -6.32 -10.14 -14.55 -15.43
8/8/2007 -18.69 -31.60 -40.99 -56.82 -62.49
8/9/2007 -9.82 -16.86 -20.87 -27.65 -26.06
8/10/2007 -4.38 -11.41 -16.25 -25.15 -42.97
8/13/2007 -4.90 -10.29 -15.17 -23.18 -28.69
8/14/2007 5.39 7.72 8.30 10.12 10.28
8/15/2007 6.79 8.96 9.63 8.46 8.35
July Sigma 1.58 1.96 2.15 2.58 3.53
1 Day 2 Days 3 Days 4 Days 5 Days
8/1/2007 0.14 -1.03 -2.69 -2.57 -0.34
8/2/2007 -0.76 -1.62 -2.57 -2.63 -2.79
8/3/2007 -0.30 -0.57 0.65 0.29 2.04
8/6/2007 -1.47 -1.79 -1.75 1.24 3.44
8/7/2007 -2.88 -4.49 1.38 4.00 4.52
8/8/2007 -3.99 3.79 7.81 8.31 8.20
8/9/2007 6.85 10.12 9.83 9.47 8.96
8/10/2007 -1.46 -1.71 -1.48 -1.84 -1.49
8/13/2007 0.19 0.82 3.79 4.61 3.77
8/14/2007 -0.95 -0.83 0.22 0.34 0.56
8/15/2007 -1.34 -0.58 0.31 0.76 1.69
Jan. to Jul. 2007 Sigma 0.36 0.49 0.59 0.66 0.69
Average Return (bps)
Total Holding Period Return (%)
Panel B: Daily Contrarian Strategy
Panel A: High-Frequency Contrarian Strategy
Construction Date
Table 1: Performance of the contrarian strategy applied to 5-minute and daily returns from
August 1 to 15, 2007. Each entry in Panel A shows the average return over the specified day
for the contrarian strategy applied to 5-minute returns when positions are held for 5, 10, 15,
30, or 60 minutes. Panel B shows the performance of the contrarian strategy based on daily
returns, with positions established based on stock returns on the “Construction Date”, and
positions are held for 1 to 5 days afterward.
Panel A of Table 1 indicates that even as early as Monday, August 6th, the deleveraging
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that began earlier (see Figure 2) seems to have overwhelmed the amount of marketmaking
capital available, and prices began exhibiting momentum during the day. This situation
became more severe on August 8th and 9th. However, the entries in Panel B of 1 show that
the premiums collected by those marketmakers on the 8th and 9th who were intrepid (and
well-capitalized) enough to hold their positions for five days would have earned unleveraged
returns of 8.20% and 8.96% from positions established on those two days, respectively. Al-
though these returns are probably not achievable (see footnote 24), even a simple comparison
with the historical standard deviation of 5-day cumulative returns, given in the last row of
Table 1, shows just how extraordinary these returns were compare to the historical norms.
These extraordinary returns are yet another indication of just how much dislocation occurred
during that fateful week.
By August 10th, it seems that supply/demand imbalances returned to more normal
levels as the daily contrarian strategies started to recover on that day (see Table 1, Panel
B), presumably as new capital flowed into the market to take advantage of opportunities
created by the previous days’ dislocation. For example, a daily contrarian portfolio based
on stock returns on August 6th suffered a 1.47% loss by the close of the market on the 7th,
and these losses continued for the next two days, reaching the high of 1.75% by the close of
the 9th. But there was a reversal on the 10th which continued through the 13th, resulting
in a cumulative profit of 3.44% over the 5-day period. We should emphasize one more time
that although this level of return is probably not achievable (see footnote 24), our argument
mainly relies on the sign and size of these returns relative to historical standard deviation as
reported in Table 1. Daily contrarian portfolios constructed on the 7th and 8th both suffered
for two days and one day, respectively, but both recovered on the 10th. In short, while prices
trended intra-day (Panel A) and even over multiple days (Panel B) during this week, they
eventually reverted back to their beginning-of-week levels by the 10th. While the managers
that had the ability to stay fully invested for the duration of this dislocation had recovered
most, if not all, of their losses by Monday, August 13th (see Figure 3), those marketmakers
with sufficient capital and fortitude to hold their positions throughout this period would
have profited handsomely. Not surprisingly, during periods of extreme dislocation, liquidity
becomes scarce and highly valued, hence those able to provide liquidity stand to earn outsized
returns.
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It should be emphasized that the returns reported in these tables and figures are all
unleveraged (2 : 1 or Regulation-T leverage) returns. The volatility and drawdowns would
have been substantially higher for leveraged portfolios—for example, a portfolio with 8 : 1
leverage and constructed based on the Price Momentum factor would have lost about 31% of
its value over the two-day period from August 8th to the 9th! And as argued by Khandani
and Lo (2007), the use of leverage ratios ranging from 4:1 to 10:1 was quite common among
quantitative equity market-neutral strategies, where the higher leverage ratios were used by
those managers engaged in high-frequency mean-reversion strategies because those strategies
exhibited the lowest volatilities and highest Sharpe ratios.
5.4 Determining the Epicenter of the Quake
When applied to transactions data, the contrarian strategy can be used to pinpoint the
origins of the Quant Meltdown even more precisely. In particular, we apply the contrarian
strategy to the following subsets of stocks: three market-cap based subsets (Small-,Mid-,
and Large-Cap subsets representing the bottom 30%, middle 40% and top 30% of stocks by
market capitalization), five factor-based subsets (each subset consists of stocks in either decile
1 or decile 10 of each of the five quantitative factors of Section 4), and six industry based
subsets, based on the twelve-industry classification codes available from Kenneth French’s
website.36 To each of these subsets, we apply the simpler version of the contrarian strategy
described in Section 5.3.
Table 2 and Figure 11 contain the returns of these portfolios from July 23rd to August
17th, the two weeks before and after August 6th. Each entry in Table 2 is the average
return of the 5-minute contrarian strategy applied to a particular subset of securities over
the specified day. As discussed in Section 5.1, days with negative average returns in Table 2
correspond to those days when price pressure due to a trending common factor overwhelmed
mean-reverting idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. This interpretation, coupled with the cumu-
lative returns of various factor-based portfolios in Figure 11 allows us to visually detect
the intra-day emergence of price pressure and determine when the liquidation began and in
which factor-based portfolios it was concentrated. Based on these results, we have developed
36See footnote 8. Note that industries with fewer than 100 stocks are included in the Other Industries
subset.
40
the following set of hypotheses regarding the epicenter of the Quant Quake of August 2007:
1. The first wave of deleveraging began as early as August 1 around 10:45am, with the ac-
tivity apparently concentrated among factor-based subsets of stocks. One can visually
detect the sudden abnormal behavior of the long/short portfolios at the exact same
time in Figure 3. Portfolios based on Book-to-Market and Earnings-to-Price dropped
in value while portfolios based on the other three factors, Cashflow-to-Market, Earn-
ings Momentum and Price Momentum, gained a little, suggesting that portfolios being
deleveraged or unwound during this time were probably long Book-to-Market and
Earnings-to-Price factors and short the other three. This wave of activity was short-
lived and by approximately 11:30am that day, markets returned to normal. By the end
of the day, the contrarian strategy applied to all subsets except for Earnings Momen-
tum and Book-to-Market yielded positive average returns for the day (see Table 2),
implying that the liquidation may have been more heavily concentrated on portfolios
formed according to these two factors.
2. The second wave started on August 6th at the market open, and lasted until approxi-
mately 1:00pm. Once again, the action was concentrated among factor-based subsets.
This time, the price pressure due to the hypothesized forced liquidation was strong
enough to overcome the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and, as such, the contrarian
strategy applied to all factor-based subsets of stocks yielded negative returns for the
entire day. Earnings-Momentum and Book-to-Market portfolios within the financial
sector suffered the largest losses, implying that the deleveraging was strongest among
these groups of stocks. The patterns in Figure 3 suggest that the portfolios being
deleveraged were probably long Book-to-Market, Price Momentum, and Cashflow-to-
Market, and short Earnings Momentum and Earnings-to-Price. Appendix A.3 contains
a more detailed analysis of the specific stocks that were affected. August 6th was re-
markable in another respect—for the first time in our sample, the contrarian strategy
applied to all stocks also registered a loss for the day (see Table 2), implying widespread
and strong price pressure due to a forced liquidation on this day.
3. On August 7th, portfolios based on Price Momentum and Cashflow-to-Market contin-
ued to drift downward as Figure 3 shows, suggesting continued deleveraging among
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portfolios based on these two factors. Furthermore, the contrarian strategy applied to
all stocks yielded a second day of negative returns, suggesting that the forced liquida-
tion carried over to this day.
4. August 8th was the start of the so-called “Meltdown”. On this day, the contrarian
strategy suffered losses when applied to any subset of stocks (factor-based, industry,
and market-cap). The sudden drop and subsequent reversal is clearly visible in Figure
3.
5. Starting on Friday August 10th, the long/short factor-based portfolios sharply reversed
their losing trend, and by the closing bell on Monday August 13th, all five long/short
portfolios were within 2% of their values on the morning of August 8th. We conjecture
that this reversal was due to two possible causes: new capital that came into the market
to take advantage of buying and selling opportunities created by the price impact of the
previous days’ deleveraging, and the absence of further deleveraging pressure because
the unwind that caused the initial losses was completed.
6. As seen in Figure 9, the price impact of trades suddenly increased as of Friday, August
10th—above and beyond the already elevated levels of the prior weeks—and stayed
high until the end of the following week, implying reduced market depth and lower
liquidity during that period. We conjecture that this was stemmed from a reduction in
market making activity, most likely from certain hedge funds engaged in high-frequency
marketmaking activities. We conjecture that the motivation for the reduction in mar-
ketmaking capital is due to the unusual trending in returns that started on August 6th
and 7th. This claim is supported by the negative average returns for the all-stocks con-
trarian strategy as shown in Table 2. The situation only got worst over the subsequent
four days, see Table 2. This revealed a much larger pending unwind than marketmakers
could handle. Unlike NYSE specialists and other designated marketmakers that are
required to provide liquidity, even in the face of strong price trends, hedge funds have
no such obligation. However, in recent years, such funds have injected considerable
liquidity into U.S. equity markets by their high-frequency program-trading activities.
Such de-facto market makers probably reduced their exposure starting on August 10th
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causing price impact to substantially increase as shown in Figure 9. This reduction in
the supply of immediacy caused the premium for immediacy to substantially rise in
the following two week as shown in Figure 10.
In Appendix A.3, we show how the contrarian strategy can be used to identify with even
greater precision the specific stocks and sectors that were involved at the start of the Quant
Meltdown of August 2007.
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Date
Small-Cap 
(Bottom 30%)
Mid-Cap 
(Middle 40%)
Large-Cap 
(Top 30%)
Book to Market 
(Decile 1&10)
Cash flow to Market 
(Decile 1&10)
Earnings to Price 
(Decile 1&10)
Price Momentum 
(Decile 1&10)
 Earnings Momentum 
(Decile 1&10)   
2007/7/23 6.19 3.45 1.94 5.43 5.97 5.89 6.38 3.09
2007/7/24 8.98 3.61 1.08 5.93 6.30 6.38 5.39 3.71
2007/7/25 7.98 1.51 0.63 5.98 5.19 7.22 6.53 1.38
2007/7/26 13.56 4.20 2.78 7.42 10.62 8.85 9.13 8.43
2007/7/27 9.63 4.83 2.04 6.81 10.49 8.52 7.58 4.72
2007/7/30 7.72 2.99 2.40 4.94 6.33 6.16 6.61 4.53
2007/7/31 7.40 2.52 0.53 2.77 3.71 1.43 2.74 3.19
2007/8/1 7.63 3.94 3.72 -0.83 0.56 0.44 0.42 -2.27
2007/8/2 9.28 7.69 1.64 4.80 6.63 7.34 7.84 6.30
2007/8/3 7.01 2.53 2.99 4.45 4.64 5.44 5.71 2.72
2007/8/6 -1.55 -1.02 -1.21 -6.52 -3.32 -3.33 -5.41 -8.11
2007/8/7 -1.02 -2.24 1.20 -0.68 0.10 -1.34 -1.04 -3.50
2007/8/8 -26.30 -18.07 -5.54 -16.16 -15.21 -18.81 -23.27 -20.08
2007/8/9 -7.93 -14.97 -2.57 -5.36 -7.93 -5.72 -9.31 -11.08
2007/8/10 -3.02 -8.89 2.54 -1.82 -0.25 2.02 -3.87 -1.58
2007/8/13 -8.10 -3.24 0.41 -7.22 -3.35 -5.05 -4.92 -4.49
2007/8/14 5.94 6.20 4.99 6.00 5.59 6.66 7.32 5.39
2007/8/15 9.31 6.42 4.62 9.25 11.12 10.98 11.09 5.57
2007/8/16 12.97 8.64 7.61 9.42 8.50 10.18 11.85 8.05
2007/8/17 18.17 14.11 6.22 16.86 16.82 17.86 17.71 15.61
Date
Computer, 
Software & 
Electronics
Money & 
Finance
Wholesale 
& Retail Manufacturing
Health Care, 
Medical Eq, Drugs  Other Industries All Stocks
2007/7/23 7.58 4.38 3.18 4.07 3.98 4.09 4.09
2007/7/24 8.41 5.38 3.84 4.96 5.87 4.90 4.90
2007/7/25 7.07 1.93 2.41 2.03 4.63 3.56 3.56
2007/7/26 10.81 6.44 5.74 7.55 7.60 7.07 7.07
2007/7/27 9.53 3.64 6.53 7.29 5.43 5.88 5.88
2007/7/30 6.10 3.82 3.86 5.40 6.70 4.72 4.72
2007/7/31 8.02 2.30 3.60 3.18 7.94 3.74 3.74
2007/8/1 9.18 3.27 11.13 9.11 3.98 5.06 5.06
2007/8/2 9.53 5.30 9.42 6.00 10.09 6.74 6.74
2007/8/3 10.23 2.62 3.31 5.49 6.14 4.28 4.28
2007/8/6 3.01 -0.60 -1.57 -0.16 4.04 -1.30 -1.30
2007/8/7 0.48 -1.20 -2.20 2.40 5.58 -1.12 -1.12
2007/8/8 -20.89 -12.16 -24.57 -18.78 -16.36 -18.69 -18.69
2007/8/9 -4.37 -3.92 -11.69 -17.36 -7.01 -9.82 -9.82
2007/8/10 0.56 1.15 -10.56 -5.27 0.12 -4.38 -4.38
2007/8/13 -3.78 -1.88 -8.20 2.82 -1.07 -4.90 -4.90
2007/8/14 6.36 7.65 5.36 7.45 4.34 5.39 5.39
2007/8/15 8.32 6.78 5.59 11.63 5.30 6.79 6.79
2007/8/16 8.69 8.94 9.89 12.02 12.96 9.46 9.46
2007/8/17 14.67 15.66 11.58 17.94 13.71 13.03 13.03
By Size By Factor 
By Industry
Table 2: The average returns for the contrarian strategy applied to various subsets of the S&P 1500 index using 5-minute
returns for July 23, 2007 to August 17, 2007. Each day is divided into non-overlapping 5-minute intervals, and positions are
established based on lagged 5-minute returns and held for the subsequent 5-minute interval. The average return for each subset
of stocks over each day of this period is then calculated. No overnight positions are allowed, initial positions are established
at 9:40am each day and all positions are closed at 4:00pm. All entries are in units of basis points.
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By Size
Small-Cap (Bottom 30%)
Mid-Cap (Middle 40%)
Large-Cap (Top 30%)
By Factor
Book to Market (Decile 1&10)
Cash flow to Market (Decile 1&10)
Earnings to Price (Decile 1&10)
Price Momentum (Decile 1&10)
 Earnings Momentum (Decile 1&10)   
By Industry
Computer, Software & Electronics
Money & Finance
Wholesale & Retail
Manufacturing
Health Care, Medical Eq, Drugs 
Other Industries
All Stocks
Figure 11: The cumulative returns for the contrarian strategy applied to various subset of the S&P 1500 index using 5-minute
returns for July 23, 2007 to August 17, 2007. Each day is divided into non-overlapping 5-minute intervals, and positions are
established based on lagged 5-minute returns and held for the subsequent 5-minute interval. The average return for each subset
of stocks over each day of this period is then calculated. No overnight positions are allowed, initial positions are established
at 9:40am each day and all positions are closed at 4:00pm.
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6 Conclusions
The events of August 2007 in U.S. equity markets provide a living laboratory for developing
insights into the dynamics of portfolio liquidity and marketmaking activity. By simulating
the performance of simple trading strategies that proxy for factor bets like Book-to-Market
and Cashflow-to-Market, we find indirect evidence of the unwinding of factor-based portfolios
starting in July 2007, and continuing through August and September 2007. By simulating
the performance of a high-frequency (5-minute-return) mean-reversion strategy that proxies
for marketmaking activity, we find indirect evidence that liquidity declined sharply during
the second week of August 2007, raising the possibility that marketmakers reduced their
risk capital in the face of mounting losses from the onslaught of portfolio liquidations by
long/short equity managers.
If these conjectures are well-founded, they point to a new financial order in which the
“crowded trade” phenomenon now applies to entire classes of hedge-fund strategies, not
just to a collection of overly popular securities. In much the same way that a passing
speedboat can generate a wake with significant consequences for other ships in a crowded
harbor, the scaling up and down of portfolios can have significant consequences for all other
portfolios and investors. Managers and investors involved in long/short equity strategies
must now incorporate this characteristic in designing their portfolios and implementing their
risk management protocols. The Quant Meltdown of 2007 is another piece of evidence
supporting the claim by Chan et al. (2007) that systemic risk in the hedge-fund industry has
risen.
The hypothesized interplay between long/short equity managers and marketmakers is
consistent with the ecological view of financial markets in Farmer and Lo (1999) and Farmer
(2002), and the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis of Lo (2004, 2005). In that framework, market
participants are not infinitely rational, but they do learn over time and adapt to changing
market conditions. As the size (as measured by assets under management or risk capital) of
one “species” grows, the population dynamics change to reflect the impact of its dominance,
and in the case of the hedge-fund industry, we can observe these changes in real time given
how quickly managers and investors adapt and evolve. Although the fallout from August
2007 was severe for many market participants, nevertheless this narrow slice of time and
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industry has been a boon to academics interested in market dynamics.
Yet another interpretation of the Quant Meltdown of August 2007 is a case study in
the how betas are born. The fact that the entire class of long/short equity strategies moved
together so tightly during August 2007 implies the existence of certain common factors within
that class. The analysis in this paper confirms the identities of several such factors, but more
refined simulations may uncover others. In any case, there should be little doubt now about
the existence of “alternative betas”, which is the next step in the natural progression from
long-only investing to indexation to long/short investing to the nascent hedge-fund beta
replication industry. To the extent that the demand for alternative investments continues to
grow, the increasing amounts of assets devoted to such endeavors will create its own common
factors that can be measured, benchmarked, managed, and, ultimately, passively replicated
as proposed in Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007).
However, our conclusions must be circumscribed by the warning that we began with
in Section 1: all of our inferences are indirect, tentative, and speculative. We have no
inside information about the workings of the hedge funds that were affected in August 2007,
nor do we have any access to proprietary prime brokerage records, trading histories, or other
confidential industry data. Therefore, our academic perspective of the events during the week
of August 6–10 should be interpreted with some caution and a healthy dose of skepticism.
These qualifications were highlighted in Khandani and Lo (2007) and we repeat them here
for completeness.
Our empirical findings are based on very simple strategies applied to U.S. stocks, which
may be representative of certain short-term market-neutral mean-reversion strategies, but
is not likely to be as good a proxy for the broader set of quantitative long/short equity
products that involve both U.S. and international equities, and other securities. A more
refined analysis using more sophisticated strategies and a broader set of assets will no doubt
yield a more complex and accurate picture of the very same events.
More importantly, even if our hypothesis is correct that an unwind initiated the losses
during the second week of August 2007, we cannot say much about the ultimate causes
of such an unwind. It is tempting to conclude that a multi-strategy proprietary trading
desk’s exposure to sub-prime mortgage portfolios caused it to reduce leverage by liquidating
a portion of its most liquid positions, e.g., a statistical arbitrage portfolio. However, another
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possible scenario is that several quantitative equity market-neutral managers decided at
the beginning of August that it would be prudent to reduce leverage in the wake of so
many problems facing credit-related portfolios. They could have deleveraged accordingly,
not realizing that this strategy was so crowded and that the price impact of their liquidation
would be so severe. Once this price impact had been realized, other funds employing similar
strategies may have decided to cut their risks in response to their losses, which then led
to the kind of “death spiral” that we witnessed in August 1998 as managers attempted to
unwind their fixed-income arbitrage positions to meet margin calls.
Finally, we conjecture that liquidations of a number of strategies and asset classes may
have started earlier. For example, other liquid investment categories such as global macro,
managed futures, and currency strategies seem to have experienced similar unwinds earlier in
2007 as problems in the sub-prime mortgage markets became more prominent in the minds
of managers and investors. The so-called “carry trade” among currencies was supposedly
unwound to some extent in July and August 2007, generating losses for a number of global
macro and currency-trading funds. Obviously, our long/short equity strategies are incapable
of detecting dislocation among currency strategies, but a simple carry-trade simulation—
similar to our simulation of the contrarian trading strategy—could shed considerable light
on the dynamics of the foreign exchange markets in recent months. Indeed, a collection
of simulated strategies across all of the hedge-fund categories can serve as a kind of multi-
resolution microscope, one with many lenses and magnifications, with which to examine the
full range of financial-market activity and vulnerabilities. It is only by deconstructing every
market dislocation that we will eventually learn how to minimize their disruptive impact on
market participants, and we hope that the insights drawn from our simulations will encourage
others to take up this important challenge.
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A Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide the details of the the computation of expected profits for the
contrarian trading strategy of Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and its appli-
cation to transactions data on August 6, 2007. In Section A.1, we derive a general expression
for the expected profit under the assumption of jointly covariance-stationary returns for in-
dividual securities. In Section A.2, we derive the expected profit for the special case of the
linear factor model (7) which incorporates an idiosyncratic marketmaking component and a
common factor that may exhibit either mean reversion or momentum. And in Section A.3,
we show how the simulated returns of the contrarian strategy can be used to identify the
specific stocks that were at the center of the Quant Meltdown of August 2007.
A.1 Expected Profits for Stationary Returns
Consider the collection of N securities and denote by Rt the N × 1 vector of their period t
returns, [R1,t · · ·RN,t]
′. Assume that Rt is a jointly covariance-stationary stochastic process
with expectation E[Rt] = µ = [µ1 · · ·µN ]
′ and auto covariance matrices
E[(Rt−l − µ)(Rt − µ)
′] = Γl = [γi,j(l)]·
Define Ri,t(q) as the q-period return of security i starting at time t:
Ri,t(q) ≡
q−1∏
k=0
(1 +Ri,t+k) − 1 ≈
q−1∑
k=0
Ri,t+k
where the approximation is needed because period returns, Ri,t, are simple returns and
logarithm of a sum is not equal to the sum of the logarithms.
We will consider the return of a market-neutral strategy which invests an amount ωi,t in
security i at time t, where:
ωi,t ≡ −
1
N
(Ri,t−1 − Rm,t−1) , Rm,t−1 ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ri,t−1 .
Define πt(q) as the profit for this strategy for a portfolio constructed at date t and held fixed
for q periods. Then we have:
πt(q) =
N∑
i=1
ωi,tRi,t(q) ≈
N∑
i=1

ωi,t
q−1∑
l=0
Ri,t+l


≈
N∑
i=1

− 1
N
(Ri,t−1 − Rm,t−1)
q−1∑
l=0
Ri,t+l


≈ −
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Ri,t−1(Ri,t + · · ·+Ri,t+q−1)) +Rm,t−1(Rm,t + · · ·+Rm,t+q−1)
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Now, taking expectations yields:
E[πt(q)] ≈ −
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
γi,i(1) + · · ·+ γi,i(q) + qµ
2
i
)
+
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(γi,j(1) + · · ·+ γi,j(q) + qµiµj) (A.1)
For lag l, the group of terms has the following structure:
−
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
γi,i(l) + µ
2
i
)
+
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(γi,j(l) + µiµj) =
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
γi,j(l) −
1
N
N∑
i=1
γi,i(l) +
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
µiµj −
1
N
N∑
i=1
µ2i
=
1
N2
ι
′
Γlι −
1
N
tr(Γl) +
1
N2
ι
′
(µµ
′
)ι −
1
N
tr(µµ
′
)) (A.2)
To simplify this expression, define the following operator
M(A) ≡
1
N2
ι
′
Aι−
1
N
tr(A) (A.3)
Note that M(·) is linear, i.e.,
M(A+B) = M(A) +M(B) (A.4)
M(αA) = αM(A) (A.5)
Now for any (N×1) column-vector c, define σ2(c) as:
σ2(c) ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
(ci − cm)
2 , cm ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
ci . (A.6)
Note that if A = cc
′
where c is an (N×1) column-vector, it is easy to show that
M(A) =
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
cicj −
1
N
N∑
i=1
c2i
= −σ2(c) (A.7)
Combining these relations and substituting (A.2) into (A.1) yields:
E[πt(q)] ≈ M(Γ1) + · · ·+ M(Γq) + qM(µµ
′
)
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≈ M(Γ1) + · · ·+ M(Γq) − qσ
2(µ) (A.8)
A.2 Expected Profits for a Linear Factor Model
Consider the following return-generating process:
Ri,t = µi + βiνt + λi,t + ηi,t (A.9a)
λi,t = −ǫi,t +
(
1− θi
θi
)
θiǫi,t−1 +
(
1− θi
θi
)
θ2i ǫi,t−2 + · · · , θi ∈ (0, 1) (A.9b)
νt = ρνt−1 + ζt , ρ ∈ (−1, 1) (A.9c)
where ǫi,t, ζt, and ηi,t are white-noise random variables that are uncorrelated at all leads and
lags.
In this specification, βiνt represents a market-wide or common factor, ηi,t represents
firm-specific fundamental shocks, and λi,t represents firm-specific liquidity shocks. The spec-
ification of this liquidity component in (A.9b) may seem odd at first, but has a natural in-
terpretation. It is an infinite-order moving average where each term ǫi,t is meant to capture
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to security i at time t, hence a positive realizations represents
buying pressure and vice versa for negative realizations. The coefficients for these idiosyn-
cratic shocks are meant to decay at a rate of θi to reflect the gradual decline in buying or
selling pressure, and they sum to one so as to eliminate any long-term impact of these shocks
on prices.
The expressions for expected profits derived in Section A.1 are functions of the variance-
covariance matrix of returns Ri,t. Since ǫi,t and ζt are uncorrelated at all leads and lags, the
covariance matrix of the Ri,t’s can be decomposed into two parts: a liquidity component and
a common-factor component. We will refer to these two parts as Γl,λ and Γl,ν , respectively,
which are related to the covariance matrix Γl by:
Γl = Γl,λ + Γl,ν . (A.10)
Because M(·) is linear, the above decomposition will simplify our derivation of expected
profits. We now turn to computing each component of Γl.
Derivation of Γl,ν
Observe that νt is a simple AR(1) process so its variance and covariances are given by :
σ2νt =
1
1− ρ2
σ2ζ
γνt,νt+l =
ρl
1− ρ2
σ2ζ = ρ
lσ2ν .
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Note that νt is multiplied by βi in the Ri,t, which will cause the covariance terms due to the
common factor between different securities to scaled accordingly. Therefore, we have:
Γl,ν = ββ
Tρlσ2ν (A.11)
where β is a column vector of the βi’s. Appealing to the linearity and other properties of
M(·) discussed in Section A.1, we have:
M(Γl,ν) = M(ββ
Tρlσ2ν) = −ρ
lσ2νσ
2(β) . (A.12)
Derivation of Γl,λ
The variance of λi,t is given by:
σ2λi =

1 +
(
1− θi
θi
)2
θ2i +
(
1− θi
θi
)2
θ4i + · · ·

 σ2ǫi
=

1 +
(
1− θi
θi
)2 (
θ2i
1− θ2i
)
σ2ǫi =
(
1 +
1− θi
1 + θi
)
σ2ǫi
=
2
1 + θi
σ2ǫi . (A.13)
To compute the covariance between λi,t and λi,t+l, we need to focus on the common ǫi,t’s in
the cross product of the MA coefficients of λi,t and λi,t+l. This yields:
γλi,t,λi,t+l =

−
(
1− θi
θi
)
θli +
(
1− θi
θi
)2
θl+2i +
(
1− θi
θi
)2
θl+4i + · · ·

σ2ǫi
=

−
(
1− θi
θi
)
θli +
(
1− θi
θi
)2
θli
θ2i
1− θ2i

σ2ǫi
=
(
1− θi
θi
)
θli
(
−1 +
1− θi
θi
θ2i
1− θ2i
)
σ2ǫi
=
(
1− θi
θi
)
θli
(
−1 +
θi
1 + θi
)
σ2ǫi
= −
(
1− θi
θi
)
θli
1
1 + θi
σ2ǫi
= −
(
1− θi
2θi
)
θliσ
2
λi
(A.14)
where we use our expression for σ2λi to simplify. Combining these yields the following ex-
pression for Γl,λ
Γl,λ = diag
(
−
1− θ1
2θ1
θl1σ
2
λ1
, . . . , −
1− θN
2θN
θlNσ
2
λN
)
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and M(Γl,λ) =
N − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
1− θi
2θi
θliσ
2
λi
. (A.15)
Derivation of Expected Profit
We can now combine Γl,ν and Γl,λ to yield an expression for the expected profit of the
contrarian strategy. Recall that the expected profit is given by:
E[πt(q)] ≈ M(Γ1) + · · · + M(Γq) − qσ
2(µ) . (A.16)
Due to the linearity of M(·) and using (A.10), we can rewrite this expression as:
E[πt(q)] ≈ M(Γ1,λ) + · · · + M(Γq,λ) +
M(Γ1,ν) + · · · + M(Γq,ν) − qσ
2(µ) . (A.17)
The two parts of this expression can be simplified as follows:
M(Γ1,λ) + · · · + M(Γq,λ) =
q∑
l=1
[
N − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
1− θi
2θi
θliσ
2
λi
]
=
N − 1
N2
q∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
1− θi
2θi
θliσ
2
λi
=
N − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
1− θi
2θi
θi
1− θqi
1− θi
σ2λi
=
N − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
1− θqi
2
σ2λi (A.18)
M(Γ1,ν) + · · · + M(Γq,ν) = −
q∑
l=1
ρlσ2νσ
2(β)
= −ρ
1− ρq
1− ρ
σ2νσ
2(β) . (A.19)
Substituting (A.18) and (A.19) into (A.17) yields the final expression for expected profits:
E[πt(q)] ≈
N − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
1− θqi
2
σ2λi − ρ
1− ρq
1− ρ
σ2νσ
2(β) − qσ2(µ) . (A.20)
A.3 Extreme Movers on August 6, 2007
Simulations of simple strategies such as the contrarian strategy can be used to pinpoint the
beginning of market dislocations when applied to transactions data. Recall that the intra-day
contrarian strategy of Section 5 invests $1 long in the worst performing decile and $1 short
in the best performing decile of lagged 5-minute returns. Given the position ωi,t of security
i at time t, the security’s contribution to the portfolio’s profit or loss over the next period
is simply ωi,tRi,t. If this value is negative, it suggests that the security experienced either a
53
negative return following a period of under-performance (recall that we invest $1 long in the
worst performing decile), or a positive return following a period of out-performance. While
such an outcome may be purely random, a sufficiently high number of such occurrences over
a given day indicates a price trend for that security and systematic losses for the contarian
strategy. Therefor, the number of periods in which a security exhibited negative contributions
to the portfolio: ∑
t
I{ωi,tRi,t<0} (A.21)
can be used as a metric to detect the start of an unwind of mean-reversion strategies, as
well as a possible decline in market liquidity due to losses accumulated by marketmaking
strategies.
Under the scenario of pure randomness, i.e., independently and identically distributed
mean-zero returns, each security has a 1/5 chance of being included in the contrarian portfolio
in each time period (recall that we long and short the bottom- and top-performing deciles).
Once the portfolio is established, each position has a 1/2 chance of contributing a loss
(negative returns following a period of under performance or position return following a
period of outperformance).37 Therefore, each security has a 1/10 chance of contributing a
negative value to the return of the contrarian strategy over each interval so the expected
value of (A.21) for each security on any given day is 7.6 (recall that the contrarian strategy
takes position 76 times each day, starting at 9:40am and closing final positions at 4:00pm).
We have ranked securities according to this metric for August 6, 2007 and list the secu-
rities with the top 50 values in Table A.1. We have also reported the decile ranking of each
security according to each of the five valuation factors as well as their market-capitalization
decile. The Open, High, Low and the Closing price as well as the High-Low spread, as a
measure of the intraday volatility, and the overall return for the day are also reported.
The stocks’ factor rankings in Table A.1 do not look random, but clearly show that the
extreme losers were concentrated in the financial sector, and had extreme factor rankings in
at least three of our valuation factors and in size—high Book-to-Market, high Earnings-to-
Price, low Earnings Momentum, and low market cap.
37Recall that we are using 5-minute returns, which is close to zero mean, hence the loss probability of 1/2
is a reasonable approximation.
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Table A.1: Top 50 securities with highest loss rankings from the contrarian strategy applied to 5-minute returns of stocks in
the S&P 1500 on August 6, 2007. Securities are ranked based on
∑
t I{ωi,tRi,t<0} where ωi,t is the weight assigned to security i
based on the returns over the preceding 5-minute interval and Ri,t is the return over the subsequent 5-minute interval. The
realized value for this metric is contained in the column ”Periods with Loss”.
Ticker Name Industry Periods 
with Loss B/M CF/M E/P
ERN 
MOM
PRC 
MOM SIZE Open ($) High ($) Low ($) Close ($)
High-Low   
Spread            
(% of Close)
Day Return
RDN RADIAN GROUP INC                 Money & Finance 35 10 10 10 1 1 6 23.27 24.50 17.44 23.23 30% 0%
SPF STANDARD PACIFIC CORP NEW        Other Industries 34 10 1 10 1 1 3 12.25 12.28 7.51 10.56 45% -14%
FFIV F 5 NETWORKS INC                 Computer, Software & Electronics 31 2 2 2 10 10 7 83.83 84.00 70.30 72.43 19% -14%
IMB INDYMAC BANCORP INC              Money & Finance 29 10 1 10 1 1 4 19.18 21.15 18.25 20.03 14% 4%
SMP STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS INC      Computer, Software & Electronics 27 10 9 4 5 10 1 10.92 10.92 7.88 8.62 35% -21%
MTG M G I C INVESTMENT CORP WIS      Money & Finance 26 10 9 10 1 3 6 33.75 35.55 28.93 33.28 20% -1%
BZH BEAZER HOMES USA INC             Other Industries 25 10 1 10 1 1 2 11.32 11.60 10.12 10.96 14% -3%
FRNT FRONTIER AIRLINES HLDGS INC      Other Industries 25 10 8 1 2 1 1 5.25 5.27 4.51 4.89 16% -7%
GFF GRIFFON CORP                     Manufacturing 25 9 2 10 1 2 2 15.70 15.92 12.00 12.98 30% -17%
VCI VALASSIS COMMUNICATIONS INC      Other Industries 24 4 6 9 1 1 2 9.52 9.66 7.67 7.88 25% -17%
LAB LABRANCHE & CO INC               Money & Finance 24 10 10 10 1 1 1 5.10 6.37 5.10 6.19 21% 21%
LFG LANDAMERICA FINANCIAL GROUP INC  Money & Finance 24 10 9 9 1 9 4 57.10 58.43 54.32 57.01 7% 0%
MESA MESA AIR GROUP INC NEV           Other Industries 24 10 1 10 1 1 1 6.45 6.45 5.42 6.11 17% -5%
ROIAK RADIO ONE INC                    Other Industries 23 10 9 1 4 2 2 4.87 4.92 3.51 4.05 35% -17%
CHUX O CHARLEYS INC                   Wholesale & Retail 22 10 10 5 5 7 1 16.76 16.76 15.47 16.39 8% -2%
CBG C B RICHARD ELLIS GROUP INC      Money & Finance 22 1 3 4 10 9 8 31.16 32.29 28.08 32.10 13% 3%
CFC COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP       Money & Finance 22 10 1 10 2 3 9 24.70 26.75 23.64 26.75 12% 8%
OMG O M GROUP INC                    Manufacturing 22 7 9 2 1 9 4 43.50 44.04 40.29 42.59 9% -2%
CHP C & D TECHNOLOGIES INC           Computer, Software & Electronics 22 N/A 1 1 6 1 1 4.85 4.85 4.13 4.32 17% -11%
NDN 99 CENTS ONLY STORES             Wholesale & Retail 22 8 2 2 5 7 3 11.71 12.15 11.20 11.96 8% 2%
CELL BRIGHTPOINT INC                  Wholesale & Retail 22 4 1 7 1 2 3 12.70 12.73 11.85 12.34 7% -3%
ABK AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC        Money & Finance 22 10 9 10 1 3 8 62.42 64.58 57.80 64.32 11% 3%
PNM P N M RESOURCES INC              Other Industries 21 10 8 8 5 3 5 22.77 23.50 21.05 22.37 11% -2%
ASTE ASTEC INDUSTRIES INC             Manufacturing 21 3 2 3 9 10 4 50.23 52.87 47.61 52.50 10% 5%
SRDX SURMODICS INC                    Other Industries 21 2 3 2 4 8 3 44.92 48.85 44.52 48.57 9% 8%
ETFC E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP           Money & Finance 21 7 8 9 4 2 8 15.98 16.29 14.73 16.19 10% 1%
CAS CASTLE A M & CO                  Wholesale & Retail 21 5 3 9 4 4 2 29.29 29.29 26.86 28.00 9% -4%
UTI UNIVERSAL TECHNICAL INSTITUTE IN Other Industries 21 2 6 5 2 7 2 23.06 23.80 22.00 23.30 8% 1%
SPC SPECTRUM BRANDS INC              Computer, Software & Electronics 21 10 10 1 1 2 1 4.50 4.50 3.77 4.15 18% -8%
SRT STARTEK INC                      Other Industries 21 9 8 3 1 1 1 10.27 11.19 10.19 11.08 9% 8%
KBR K B R INC                        Other Industries 20 5 10 2 N/A N/A 7 31.93 32.60 31.15 32.49 4% 2%
UNF UNIFIRST CORP                    Wholesale & Retail 20 8 8 6 8 9 2 37.51 39.11 35.25 38.76 10% 3%
MHO M I HOMES INC                    Other Industries 20 10 1 10 1 1 1 23.66 23.91 22.49 23.84 6% 1%
PRAA PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES IN Money & Finance 20 4 5 6 10 9 3 46.52 51.64 44.26 51.52 14% 11%
CHB CHAMPION ENTERPRISES INC         Other Industries 20 5 5 10 1 9 3 11.54 11.54 10.26 10.88 12% -6%
BSC BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC       Money & Finance 20 9 1 10 1 2 9 106.89 113.81 99.75 113.81 12% 6%
FED FIRSTFED FINANCIAL CORP          Money & Finance 20 10 1 10 3 3 2 40.73 43.00 38.73 41.75 10% 3%
LEH LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC     Money & Finance 20 8 1 10 10 5 10 56.50 58.50 52.63 58.27 10% 3%
NILE BLUE NILE INC                    Wholesale & Retail 20 1 2 2 9 10 4 82.00 84.81 78.20 82.00 8% 0%
MEE MASSEY ENERGY CO                 Other Industries 20 6 8 2 6 3 5 19.10 19.14 17.90 18.07 7% -5%
BBX BANKATLANTIC BANCORP INC         Money & Finance 19 10 1 6 N/A 1 1 7.75 8.48 7.53 8.39 11% 8%
MBI M B I A INC                      Money & Finance 19 10 7 10 4 4 8 50.81 56.20 48.95 56.20 13% 11%
OMN OMNOVA SOLUTIONS INC             Other Industries 19 2 7 2 1 2 1 5.22 5.42 4.80 5.27 12% 1%
IFC IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP             Money & Finance 19 10 10 10 3 1 1 10.18 10.37 9.32 10.00 11% -2%
PMTC PARAMETRIC TECHNOLOGY CORP       Computer, Software & Electronics 19 2 2 3 10 8 5 17.31 17.49 16.16 16.61 8% -4%
MTEX MANNATECH INC                    Health Care, Medical Eq, Drugs  19 5 9 10 7 4 1 9.19 9.43 8.59 8.93 9% -3%
CAR AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC            Other Industries 19 10 10 1 N/A 6 6 24.05 24.97 21.22 23.28 16% -3%
MRO MARATHON OIL CORP                Other Industries 19 5 9 10 7 8 10 50.29 50.73 46.97 49.24 8% -2%
RSCR RES CARE INC                     Health Care, Medical Eq, Drugs  19 8 5 8 5 4 2 18.71 19.13 17.62 18.60 8% -1%
CAE CASCADE CORP                     Manufacturing 19 4 5 6 10 10 3 68.05 68.57 63.51 66.14 8% -3%
Factor and Size Deciles Price and Return Data
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